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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This investigation focuses on the changes in students’ conceptual structures of complex 
systems (e.g., emergence, dynamic equilibrium, nonlinearity) after using the computer-modeling 
tool StarLogo with the support of cognitive coaching (ontological training). Three simulations 
were used: Slime, FreeGas, and Wolf Sheep Predation. Two questions were addressed: Do 
students’ explanatory frameworks of scientific phenomena (ontological beliefs) change as a 
consequence of ontological training? And What Complex Systems concepts do students acquire 
during the instructional activities? 
The results of this study suggest that the ontological training facilitated the creation of 
emergent framework mental models (EFMMs). This conclusion is supported by evidence that 
five of the nine students learned six Complex-Systems concepts: multiple-levels of organization, 
local interactions, probabilistic causes, open systems, random behavior, and tags. However, not 
all simulations were equally able to facilitate understanding of the Complex Systems concepts 
and none facilitated an understanding of nonlinearity, diversity and simple rules.  
These results support educational efforts to use modeling tools to reify and build more 
global representational frameworks that are consistent with science experts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the current trends in science education is to look at the generalities that are present 
across disciplines. When scientific theories are investigated at the philosophical level it is 
possible to abstract a general conceptual framework from the specifics that differentiate them 
(Auyang, 1998). These general concepts (i.e., thing, event, process, causality, relationship, part 
and whole, space and time, etc.) may also be referred to as explanatory frameworks used to 
interpret and explain the world. Furthermore, they appear to be the component characteristics of 
distinct ontological categories (Chi, Slotta, & deLeeuw, 1994) that allow us to share ideas and 
build theories. Auyang states: 
 
The categorical framework is general and not biased toward any theory. It abstracts from 
scientific theories, which in turn abstract from the specifics of wide ranges of 
phenomena. The shared categorical framework of different theories reveals both the 
general way of our thinking and a general commonality among the topics of the theories 
thus our consideration must include the phenomena the sciences try to understand. (p. 9) 
 
 
But what happens when we do not share similar explanations for a major class of 
phenomena? Or worst yet, we do not even “see” similar categorical frameworks extending across 
various phenomena? It is theorized that this is precisely why many science concepts are difficult 
for the novice to grasp. In science, many underlying structural and process attributes are not 
consistent with the surface features of the phenomena. Novice learners tend to build explanations 
(mental models) based on surface features and their intuitive, naïve interpretations therefore lead 
to incorrect conclusions and misconceptions (Glynn & Duit, 1995; Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 
1981; Chi, Slotta, & deLeeuw, 1994; Vosniadou, 1994).  
If this is the case, what if we were to take a different approach: identify common 
underlying structural and process attributes and teach these instead? Would that facilitate deeper 
level understanding? These are the fundamental questions of this present study. We argue that 
teaching students (novice learners) certain principles of complex systems thinking is possible and 
that students are then able to change certain aspects of their explanatory frameworks used in 
solving both near to the model and far from the model problems. We also argue that the 
behaviors of complex systems, as demonstrated in the multi-agent modeling language StarLogo, 
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are consistent with identified dimensions of the category of  “emergence” type ontological 
beliefs (referred to as “component beliefs” in Jacobson, 2000) and therefore offer affordances for 
learning about underlying emergent causal processes.  
 
Operational Definitions 
Before moving forward it is necessary to clarify the intended meaning of the key 
concepts used in this study. To begin, the term “emergent processes” or “emergence” is used 
primarily to describe the behavior that arises from a collective (meta-agent) composed of a large 
number of smaller parts (the agents) that do not themselves exhibit behavior at all like that of the 
whole. Emergence is also described as the ability to generate complex behavior (complexity) 
from a small set of laws or rules. To illustrate this description, patterns generated by birds 
flocking, ant trails, the “human wave’, are all examples of emergent processes. Another less 
visual example of emergence is a board game. Although there are many built-in constraints 
imposed by the rules, the outcomes are too numerous to describe (Holland, 1998).  Thus 
emergence, is defined as: a phenomenon which relies on the interactions of multiple agents, all 
operating under the same constraints (rules) without centralized control, yet affected by 
probabilistic causes and feedback loops that generate nonlinear effects creating dynamic self-
organizing systems behaviors.  
Many, but not all, complex systems exhibit emergent behaviors. It should be noted that in 
this study we were primarily interested in complex systems thinking that relates to the 
understanding of emergent causal processes. Therefore, only references to emergent causal 
behaviors were identified and analyzed from the students’ interactions with the StarLogo models. 
The definition of the term ontological category as used in this paper is: a personally held 
“theory” or “belief” associated with what the world is and what it contains (Flood & Carson, 
1993). It can be said also that it is “our way of explaining the world”; hence it contains basic 
axioms, and a set of causal predicates that can be judged as true or false  (Keil, 1979).  
The phrase “emergent causal framework ontology” refers to the ontological category that 
offers an explanation for the behaviors of the particular types of phenomena that exhibit the 
behaviors described above (i.e., aggregating, decentralized control, nonlinear effects, random 
actions, probabilistic causes, and dynamic self-organizing nature). Although there may be other 
less liberal definitions of the emergent causal ontological category (see Perkins & Grotzer, 2000) 
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this more inclusive definition allows us to bring greater consistency between conceptual change 
research (Chi 2000b) and the expanding literature of complexity research (e.g., Holland, 1995; 
1998; Jacobson, 2000; Wilensky 1999). Later in this paper the development of the ontological 
category related to emergent causal explanations will be expanded upon, as well as the mental 
representations that are evidence of these internally held explanatory frameworks. 
A final point of clarification: the term “emergent processes” or “emergence” should not 
be confused with either everyday usage or with the meaning as seen in qualitative data analyses 
where categories and themes “emerge” from the data. Thus the reader should pay attention to the 
context in order to ensure they are correctly interpreting the intended meaning for this 
terminology. 
 
1.1 The Problem 
 
The literature of schema-based learning theories describes three types of learning: 
accretion, tuning and cognitive restructuring (Rumelhart & Norman, 1976). Research conducted 
in the area of cognitive restructuring generally is assembled under the heading of conceptual 
change. Growing interest in this field led to the identification of difficulties in learning key 
science topics such as electricity in physics (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; White, 1993), gas 
laws and equilibrium in chemistry (Wilson, 1998), and in the biological sciences such concepts 
as diffusion, osmosis (Odom, 1995; Settlage, 1994), and evolution (Anderson & Bishop 1986; 
Brumby, 1984; Jacobson & Archodidou, 2000). 
It is very difficult to achieve cognitive restructuring, generally referred to as conceptual 
change. Thus far, research has shown that the presentation of anomalous data – information that 
contradicts the pre-instructional beliefs and theories — is generally met with resistance from the 
learner and seldom leads to conceptual change (Chinn & Brewer, 1993; Chinn & Brewer, 1998). 
There are several researchers who have followed this route and achieved differential levels of 
success (Tao & Gunstone, 1999; Chan, Burtis & Bereiter, 1997; Windschitl & Andre, 1998). 
They have combined constructivist instructional strategies, such as collaborative learning, 
computer-based instruction, knowledge building activities, metacognitive prompts, multiple 
analogies, in order to facilitate the acceptance of the anomalous data. However, these studies 
have not attempted to build a theory of conceptual change. Further, they have not addressed the 
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underlying cause of the misconceptions. Chinn and Brewer (1993) propose that the crux of the 
problem is the learner’s efforts to coordinate theory and data. These authors offer four 
characteristics that may account for the different responses to anomalous data. They are as 
follows: 
 
• Entrenchment of prior theory 
• Ontological beliefs  
• Epistemological commitments 
• Background knowledge 
 
Chinn and Brewer (1993) also tell us that in the case of robust misconceptions, these four 
characteristics may not play an equal role. Intuitive “naïve” beliefs about the nature of existence 
and the fundamental categories and properties of the world (ontological beliefs), and beliefs 
about knowledge and how it is acquired (epistemological beliefs), may be deeply intertwined 
with who we are, as well as how and what we can learn. If we accept their argument, then these 
beliefs are likely associated with hopes and fears and therefore are rigorously defended and very 
resistant to change. 
Conceptual change models fall into two primary groups, the more conventional view 
known as an accommodation model, posited by Piaget, and elaborated on by Strike and Posner 
(1985, 1992) who consider the conceptual ecology of the learner but assert that, through reason, 
the more fruitful explanation will be adopted. The other camp takes a more structural approach, 
positing that it is the very nature of the explanation, the underlying beliefs of causation that need 
to be addressed. Within these models are: (1) Vosniadou’s “framework theories” (e.g., 
Vosniadou & Brewer, 1994), (2) diSessa’s “causal net” (diSessa & Sherin, 1998), and (3) Chi’s 
“ontological beliefs” (Chi et al. 1994). Although these researchers disagree on several 
fundamental points related to how coherent or fragmented these naïve “theories” or beliefs are, 
they agree that these beliefs need to be altered in order to repair and/or remove misconceptions.  
Arguably the problem of robust misconceptions is an important problem to be solved, 
furthermore, a general theory of conceptual change is required. In order to move the debate 
forward, it is necessary to empirically as well as theoretically explore the assertions of these 
models. This present study addresses this need. 
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 1.2 Theoretical Foundation 
 
This study took as its starting point the conceptual change theory proposed by Chi and 
her colleagues (Chi, 1993; Chi & Slotta, 1996; Chi et al., 1994; Ferrari & Chi, 1998; Slotta & 
Chi, 1996, 1999; Slotta, Chi & Joram, 1995). The basic assumption of their theory is that all 
conceptions are classified into ontological categories — ordered hierarchical trees of super-
ordinate and subordinate systems — based on attributes that are perceived or suggested to the 
learner. These schema-like associations act as facilitators or inhibitors of future transfer of 
knowledge and are part of general accretion and tuning.  
Chi’s theory is intended to explain concepts that, in the case of science education, fall 
within the ontological category of “processes”. Within this category there are “event-type” 
processes and “emergent-type” processes. It is hypothesized that most of the misconceptions 
occur when concepts (e.g., electricity, osmosis, diffusion, equilibrium, evolution), which 
scientifically speaking, belong to the emergent process ontology, are assigned to other 
ontological categories (e.g., heat, electricity to the category of “material substances”; or 
evolution and diffusion to the category of “events”). Thus it is hypothesized that novices, unlike 
experts, assign concepts to ontological categories that are unable to support explanations of the 
phenomena, thereby acquiring robust misconceptions and flawed knowledge acquisition. Slotta 
and Chi (1999) state, “once an ontological commitment is made with respect to a concept, it is 
difficult for this to be undone” (p.8). The basic assumptions of Chi’s conceptual change theory 
may thus be summarized as follows:  
a) Concepts acquire membership in ontological categories through common language 
(predicates). 
b) Concepts are assigned to an ontological tree in a hierarchical structure — therefore 
the structure of knowledge in categories is hierarchical.  
c) The teaching of a new ontological category is possible. 
d) The reassignment of an entity to another ontological category is necessary and 
possible for conceptual change and understanding. 
e) Ontological attributes are distinct for members of each ontological tree. There are 
differences in the attributes of entities that belong to different trees. 
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f) Novices, more often than not, place entities into ontological categories based on 
surface level features. 
g) Several concepts display contradictions between their surface features and their deep 
level features. On the surface, the attributes of these concepts resemble one type of 
ontological category while their veridical attributes belong to another ontological 
category. Chi et al. (1994) suggest that many scientific concepts require conceptual 
change across trees and that is why they are difficult to learn.  
 
The actual mechanisms of assignment to ontological categories are a very important part 
of the discussion and understanding of Chi’s conceptual change theory. It is postulated that 
explanatory frameworks are used to organize and express the ontological commitments present 
in the learner’s cognitive structure (Slotta & Chi, 1999). These authors argue that explanatory 
frameworks are the key to operationalizing the learner’s ontological commitments, and 
identifying the ontological boundaries between two explanatory frameworks is a means to assess 
conceptual change . Hence, reassignment of concepts from one ontological category to another is 
taken to entail learning a new explanatory framework. This may require learning new 
terminology, acquiring new mental models through expository and discovery learning, and may 
even demand new attitudes and values (e.g., epistemological beliefs, control beliefs, emotional 
loadings, and changed motivation). 
 
1.2.1 Complex Systems as a Way of Thinking 
Mitchel Resnick, Uri Wilensky, and Walter Stroup have championed research pertaining 
to the use of complex systems as a better way of thinking about science. These authors have used 
the computer environment and the power of multi-agent modeling language (MAML) 
programming to create simulations that demonstrate characteristics of complex systems that 
challenge naïve ontological beliefs about centralized versus decentralized control, determinacy 
versus randomness , order versus chaos. “In the minds of many, the study of complexity is not 
just a new science, but a new way of thinking about all science, a fundamental shift from the 
paradigms that have dominated scientific thinking for the past 300 years” (Resnick & Wilensky, 
1997, p. 4). Initial studies conducted by Resnick (1994) and Wilensky (1995) tell us that the use 
of particular types of simulations can afford understanding of specific aspects of complexity – 
knowledge of the process of emergence and the subsequent development of non-isomorphic 
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levels of organization. They have demonstrated that the use of Starlogo simulations is a powerful 
means of destabilizing simplistic entrenched conceptions and of facilitating multi-level thinking. 
Their work has focused mainly on young learners with very few other empirical studies to date.  
Jacobson's (2000) most recent work has further explored the relationship between 
complex systems concepts and conceptual beliefs. He has demonstrated that novice learners', 
when solving specific types of problems, use “component beliefs” (ontological and 
epistemological) that are correlated with what he calls “clockwork” theories which are reductive 
and influenced by a Newtonian view of science. On the other hand, experts, in solving the same 
problems, used component beliefs that were correlated with “emergent” theories, equated to 
complex systems concepts. Results from Jacobson’s study were obtained from a small sample 
and are non-parametric provisional findings; however, they indicate a significant qualitative 
difference between expert and novice thinking when solving emergent framework questions. 
Hence, this present study aspires to contribute to the body of literature that contends there is a 
relationship between component beliefs and conceptual change, and complex systems thinking.  
In addition, there is a body of literature that argues for the use of elements of complexity 
theory in the classroom. Boyd (1997) suggests that it is possible to introduce elements of 
“cybersystemics” into the regular curriculum. Others such as Auyang (1997), Bar-Yam (1997), 
Kaput, Bar-Yam, and Jacobson (1999) contend that complex systems may function as a unifying 
and cross-disciplinary theme. In fact, at the most recent New England Complex Systems Institute 
annual conference, Jacobson, Jakobsson, Lemke, and Wilensky (2002) challenged the science 
education community to explore the potential of using complex systems ideas in the classroom. 
They stated: “the conceptual basis of complex systems ideas reflects a change in perspective 
about our world that is important for students to develop, as it corresponds to the scientific 
environment that will exist when they graduate. This perspective emphasizes both the limits of 
predictability as well as the possibility of understanding indirect consequences of actions taken, 
both positive and negative, through modeling the interdependence of our world” (p.2). 
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1.3 Purposes and Significance of the Study 
 
Hence, this current study will focus directly on how the properties of complex systems 
such as emergence, non-linear behavior, and probabilistic behaviors, which appear to be 
particularly challenging to "naïve" learners, are constructed when explicitly attended to in 
instructional activities. In so doing, we addressed the following three questions: 
 
1. Do student’s explanatory frameworks of scientific phenomena (ontological beliefs) 
change as a consequence of an instructional intervention utilizing simulations of complex 
systems (i.e., StarLogo) and supported by cognitive scaffolding? 
2. What Complex Systems concepts do students acquire during the instructional activities? 
3. What is the development of students’ systems thinking? 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Concepts are construed as intrinsically relational sorts of things. They are not isolated 
entities connected only in the service of propositions. No individual concept can be 
understood without some understanding of how it relates to other concepts. Concepts are 
not mere probabilistic distributions of features or properties, or passive reflections of 
feature frequencies and correlations in the world; nor are they simple lists of necessary 
and sufficient features. They are mostly about things in the world, however, and bear 
nonarbitrary relations to features frequencies and correlations, as well as providing 
explanations of those frequencies and correlations. If it is the nature of concepts to 
provide such explanations, they can be considered to embody systematic sets of beliefs – 
beliefs that may be largely causal in nature. (Keil, 1989, p.1). 
 
Theories of Concepts 
Our ability to evaluate the relative merit of different theoretical positions on conceptual 
change requires that we appreciate several basic aspects of concepts and concept formation. 
Conceptual structure as proposed by the “theory-based” view1 of concept formation pose two 
major concerns that impact on conceptual change research. First, because of the principle 
assumption that concepts are embedded in a network, the implications are that change to one 
component may involve a change to other components and possibly the entire system. Hence, it 
is reasonable to posit that the resulting cognitive behavior is likely to exhibit nonlinear (defined 
as non-additive) and possibly emergent characteristics; a view that appears to be supported by 
Limón (2001). Second, and more importantly perhaps, is that causal explanations (theories) will 
be a focal determinant of change in concept formation and categorization process.  
Conceptual change theories that focus on multiple causal mechanisms are the most 
promising as explanations of the process of change. Supporting this conjecture, Ahn (1998) 
claims that there is reason to believe that self-explanations of causes are considerably more 
important than explaining effects in the process of categorization. While Keil (1989) makes an 
even stronger case for the role of causation, suggesting that explanations of causal relationships 
generate beliefs. Addressing the differences between novice and experts, he states that: “it 
                                                 
1 The literature describes four major schools of thought on concepts and concept formation: 
1. Classical Logical Definitional theories 
2. Prototype Probabilistic theories 
3. Associative Theory-based theory 
4. Atomism theory 
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seems almost certain that a host of interconnected beliefs about the mechanisms of objects 
underlies and constrains the novice’s choice of problem groups… [While experts] have 
probably shifted away from attempting to characterize the problem space in terms of 
definitions-like rules and instead have incorporated a far more complex set of intricate [co-] 
causal relationships more along the lines of the homeostasis model [e.g., the feedback control]” 
(p. 261). 
 
2.1 Conceptual Change Theories 
 
 In reviewing the conceptual change literature we selected three of the premier models 
that hold the most promise for a genuine theory of conceptual change. Although these models 
differ on several major assumptions, there are equally several specific dimensions where they 
support each other in a principled manner (see Table 1).   
 
General Background 
The foundations of most conceptual change theories include a Piagetian motivational  
theory of cognitive development. Piaget (1975) proposed that disequilibrium, dissatisfaction, or 
discord must be created within the child between their initial conception and the to-be-learnt one. 
The attempt to resolve this cognitive conflict results in the processes of “assimilation” or 
“accommodation”2 of the new idea. This notion of dissatisfaction is at the base of several early 
models of conceptual change. However, some studies in the field have moved away from 
theories of cognitive conflict to theories of knowledge restructuring (e.g., Chi et al., 1994; 
Vosniadou, 1994). 
                                                 
2 Assimilation refers to situations in which the learners’ existing theories allow them to explain new situations; 
whereas accommodation describes situations in which the learners’ theories cannot account for or explain the new 
phenomena therefore must be revised, reorganized, or replaced. 
 12
Table 1.     Comparisons of Conceptual Change Models 
Model Intuitive theories Misconceptions created by Conceptual change occurs when Techniques for conceptual 
change 
Process 
 
Strike & 
Posner 1985; 
1992;  
Thagard 
1987? 
Many factors 
conceptual ecology 
some have 
explanatory 
coherence. 
 
(Does not state 
specifically) 
Confrontation or competition 
between two incompatible but 
equally well organized theories.  
 
Knowledge replacement models 
(other example is Thagard, 1992) 
 
Other factors: conceptual ecology 
including motivation and goals. 
1.  Instruction of alternative 
information. 
2.  Cognitive artifacts used 
to achieve change: 
- analogies 
- metaphors 
3.  Extensive use of 
constructivist techniques. 
Four stage process: 
1. Minimal understanding of 
new conception 
2. Dissatisfaction with existing 
conceptions 
3. Plausibility of new conception 
4. Fruitfulness of new 
conception 
 
Vosniadou 
1994; 1998 
Coherent theories: 
a) Framework 
theory 
b) Specific subject 
dependent theory 
The synthetic stage where 
new information is added 
to existing initial model. 
1. Initial stage 
2. Synthetic stage 
3. Scientific stage 
Realization that new information is 
inconsistent with specific theories or 
framework theories. Restructuring is 
therefore a continuous gradual 
enrichment.  
 
Instruction of scientific 
information. 
Two phased process: 
1. requires metaconceptual 
awareness. 
2. change in specific beliefs and 
framework  
Two types of Concept Change: 
1) spontaneous, without need of 
instruction. 
2) instructionally based. This 
process is a slow revision and 
gradual incorporation of science 
explanation. 
diSessa 
1993; 1998 
Fragmented 
knowledge 
structures in the 
form of p-prims. 
 
(Does not state 
specifically) 
Slow refinement  & restructuring of 
intuitive knowledge structures, 
p-prims, to formal principles of 
science. 
Shift in way of “seeing” which is a 
separate change in readout strategies 
and causal net. 
Instruction of alternative 
causal net and readout 
strategies. 
Iterative process of changes in: 
1. Readout strategies 
2. Causal net 
 
Chi 
1993; 1994; 
1997; 1999; 
2000 
Coherent 
knowledge 
structures but not at 
the level of theory, 
rather organized as 
a schema or frame. 
Assignment of concept to 
the incorrect ontological 
tree. 
Reassignment of concept to different 
ontological tree. 
Change in preexisting conception. 
Instruction of alternative 
ontological process 
category – specifically 
“emergent” processes. 
Shift in reassignment to correct 
ontological category. 
 
 
 2.1.1 Dissatisfaction and Knowledge Replacement Theories 
 
Strike and Posner’s (1985) model of conceptual change expanded on Piaget’s ideas of 
conceptual change through accommodation and assimilation. These authors contended that 
accommodation requires taking into account the alternative conception and comparing it to the 
existing conception; if the plausibility status of the alternative conception reaches a level that 
exceeds that of the original conception, then there will be a change. Four stages were identified: 
(1) dissatisfaction with original conception, (2) intelligible replacement conception, (3) 
plausibility of new conception, and finally (4) fruitfulness of new conception leading to 
replacement. A central claim of the conceptual change theory proposed by Strike and Posner 
(1985) is that new conceptions are understood, judged, acquired, or rejected in a conceptual 
context – a conceptual ecology. Hence, old and new concepts coexist. Cautioning that there were 
many factors other than the conceptions themselves that may affect status, they suggested that 
the learner would experience stops, starts, and even retreats along the road to change. 
In their revised discussion of conceptual change, Strike and Posner (1992) extended the 
role of the conceptual ecology. Proposing that misconceptions are not the product of clearly 
articulated beliefs, rather, they are artifacts of deeply entrenched problems in the conceptual 
‘ecology’. Raising the issue of stability, they suggested that misconceptions may be weakly 
formed, temporal and not consistent; in fact, they may be influenced by the conceptual ecology. 
Addressing the issue of conceptual structure they draw attention to the systemic nature of the 
conceptual network. 
Importance of this model. The importance of Strike and Posner’s model is twofold: (1) its 
attention to factors such as motives and goals that influence the learners’ conceptual ecology, 
and (2) its applicability to classroom instruction. It has been the cornerstone of most conceptual 
change instructional interventions, however these studies have produced some equivocal results 
(e.g., Chan, Burtis & Bereiter, 1997; Champagne, Gunstone & Klopfer, 1985; Jensen & Finley, 
1996; Limón & Carretero, 1997). Because this model does not adequately address how to build 
an alternative conception, it falls outside the focus of this present study and is set aside for the 
moment. Perhaps, when we have a better understanding of the processes and mechanisms of 
conceptual change, this contribution to a global conceptual change theory should be revisited for 
its perspective on issues of ecological accommodation.  
 2.1.2  Knowledge Restructuring Theories 
 
 If concepts are indeed embedded in stable complex networks of other concepts that 
represent naïve or personal theories, then conceptual change will be a formable task. If in 
addition, these theories are held together by causal self-explanations composed of the most basic 
units of our thinking – ontological and/or epistemological beliefs – then how do we start to 
unravel the problem of deeply held misconceptions that are ubiquitous in science learning (see, 
for example, Driver, 1995 or Pfundt & Duit, 1994)? Consider the following theories as steps 
toward clarifying a possible integrated causal approach to conceptual change. 
 
Vosniadou – Framework and Specific Theories 
 Vosniadou (1994) argues that concepts are entrenched and constrained within a larger 
theoretical structure. This author identifies two levels of theories that control the learners’ 
beliefs, naïve framework theories and various specific theories. Vosniadou proposes that the 
learner’s framework theory is not available to his conscious awareness; nonetheless, this theory 
constrains the process of acquiring veridical knowledge about the physical world. These theories 
are a function of ontological and epistemological presuppositions. Specific theories on the other 
hand, are consciously accessible, exist within a domain and consist of a set of interrelated 
propositions that describe the observed behavior of physical objects. That is, the specific theory 
is based on the individual’s observations, as well as the instructional information, and it is 
developed within the constraints of the presuppositions of their framework theory. These two 
classes of theories come together to create the mental model, the lens, through which the learner 
builds causal explanations of the world. 
 Definition of conceptual change. Vosniadou (1994) identifies two kinds of conceptual 
change: enrichment and revision. The former is described as the simple addition of new 
information to existing knowledge, and achieved through the process of accretion. The latter is 
considered conceptual change and viewed as a substantial change that is realized by the learner 
when new information is inconsistent with specific theories or framework theories. She posits 
that inconsistencies between new information and framework theories are more difficult to 
resolve than inconsistencies with specific theories.  
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 Difficulties in removing misconceptions. Vosniadou suggests that conceptual change is 
difficult because framework theories are coherent systems of explanations that are based on 
everyday experiences and grounded in years of confirmation. Additionally, because these are 
ontologically and epistemologically based, a shift in any of these beliefs will create a shift in the 
entire system of the framework theory and all the other knowledge built upon it. This assertion is 
similar to implications of Strike and Posner’s conceptual ecology. 
 Failure to learn certain concepts has been attributed to inconsistencies between the to-be-
learnt knowledge and framework theories. These occur when children attempt to add information 
to the false existing mental structure. The author describes inert knowledge as the product of 
inconsistent information being stored in separate microstructures and used only in particular 
situations. Whereas, misconceptions are the result of learners trying to reconcile the inconsistent 
pieces of information and in the process produce synthetic mental models3.  We contend that this 
attempt to account for anomalous data draws this part of Vosniadou’s model closer to the 
cognitive conflict approach. Therefore, her model may be viewed as a bridge between Strike and 
Posner’s model and those that will be described next. 
 Importance of the model. Vosniadou and Brewer’s (1994) empirical findings suggest: (1) 
there is a sequence in which concepts are acquired in a conceptual domain; and, (2) that the 
importance of mental models is a constraint on the knowledge acquisition process. These 
findings have given rise to their theoretical supposition that conceptual change is gradual and 
will give rise to misconceptions. They also suggest that there are developmentally distinct stages 
in conceptual change: (1) initial mental model, (2) synthetic mental model – learner attempts to 
reconcile the science model with initial model, and (3) scientific mental model. Another group of 
researchers, Jacobson and Archodidou (2000), have successfully identified these developmental 
stages in their study of conceptual change instruction on the topic of evolution.  
 Recently, Vosniadou and Ioannides (1998) have made two major refinements to the 
original model. Firstly, they have identified distinctions between types of conceptual change 
suggesting that conceptual change can be: (1) spontaneous, or (2) instructionally based. The 
former type is a change resulting from enriched observations in social learning context without 
                                                 
3 According to Vosniadou and Brewer (1994), synthetic mental models are likely to be formed when the knowledge 
acquisition process requires revision of framework theories based thus are part of the presuppositions constructed on 
our interpretations of everyday experiences. Synthetic models function as intermediary steps in the conceptual 
change process from an initial intuitive model to the scientifically culturally accepted one. 
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formal science instruction. Examples of this would be language learning as a result of 
socialization with adults and older children as a child matures. The latter is a result of formal 
instruction that requires the building of synthetic models in an effort to reconcile science 
instruction into existing theories (e.g., understanding of astronomical processes). 
 Secondly, they have elaborated on Vosniadou’s (1994) original assertions regarding the 
refinement process. The role played by metaconceptual awareness has been strengthened and 
refinement is viewed as the development of  “theoretical frameworks with greater systematicity, 
coherence, and explanatory power [i.e., more scientific]” (Vosniadou & Ioannides, 1998, p. 
1222). This feature is an important contribution to the development of the prescriptive side of the 
conceptual change debate. Additionally as will be shown, it is also a consistent theme between 
models, although it may be argued that Vosniadou makes the biggest commitment to its 
importance. 
 
DiSessa’s and Sherin’s Model 
Along the continuum of conceptual change models, the work of diSessa and Sherin 
(1998) is positioned closer to that of Chi and her colleagues. Similar to Chi, they too focus on the 
deeper issues of process and mechanism of concept formation and concept change. In fact, it 
may even be argued that theirs is a fuller model of concept formation. we will briefly describe 
this model with a focus on its assertions regarding the processes of what they call the 
coordination classes, a major structural component in concept change. 
The basic assumptions of the model. Based on the research supporting the supposition 
that naïve learners possess impoverished causal models for understanding physics concepts 
(Gentner & Stevens, 1983), diSessa (1993b) developed his model of concept formation. He 
identified this attribution as the “naïve sense of mechanism”, suggesting that this belief of 
causality is composed of phenomenological primitives (here forward referred to as p-prims) 
which are abstracted from common experiences. P-prims are the smallest unit of particular 
knowledge elements4 and indeed may generate their own self-explanations. In these cases, 
diSessa (1993b) states that p-prims are the intuitive equivalent of physical laws and form the 
bases upon which one sees and explains the world. Hence, p-prims account for structures that 
                                                 
4 Not unlike “Conversation theory” concepts as described by Gordon Pasks (Boyd, 1997). 
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diSessa calls causal nets.  However, p-prims are not concepts themselves, and multiple p-prims 
are involved in the creation of causal nets. 
Causal nets may be described as approximately corresponding to what people intuitively 
expect of causality, which is logical given their status as composites of p-prims. In addition, in 
some instances, they can be interpreted to mean the reasoning strategies used to explain how 
some observations are related to the information at hand. In their words: “Causal nets are, 
roughly, our replacement for the ‘theories that lie behind observations’. Or the theories 
implicated in theory-based notions of categories” (diSessa & Sherin, 1998, p. 1174), hence, 
causal nets, may be described as the inference-based explanations used to make sense of the 
world, which in turn form the basis of our theories. These authors link this explanatory 
mechanism to concept acquisition through a structural component called a coordination class. In 
order to understand this sophisticated interwoven play of components requires some background 
information. 
Background on coordination classes. DiSessa and Sherin (1998) first suggest that 
concepts are not all the same. In fact, concepts such as ‘robin’ are different from those such as 
‘velocity’ or ‘force’ and require different cognitive processing. While the former requires sorting 
into the category-like concept of bird, the latter two fall into a special class of concepts that they 
refer to as coordination classes. These coordination classes are made of structural components 
that perform two distinct activities: (1) centered on gathering information through selecting what 
to ‘see’ (referred to as “readout strategies”), and the other, (2) based on the already mentioned 
causal net activity.  
Part one, the readout strategy, or information gathering, is equated to a metaphorical 
‘seeing’, and the shift in the means of seeing is considered to be the core problem of conceptual 
change. They state: “In many instances this seeing is a substantial accomplishment of learning 
and will depend only very partially on basic perceptual capabilities. In addition, these forms of 
seeing sometimes involve explicit strategies and extended reasoning” (diSessa& Sherin, 1998, p. 
1171). We will return to this point shortly. 
Elaborating on the readout strategies they identify two subcomponents of this phase: (1) 
integration, which refers to the fact that multiple observations or aspects may need to be 
coordinated so as to determine the requisite information; and, (2) invariance (we would suggest 
that it could be considered a type of concept stability), which refers to the knowledge that 
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accomplishes the readout of information from different instances and situations, must 
consistently and reliably determine the same information. 
Part two of the coordination classes process takes us back to the important explanatory 
mechanism, causal nets. Learning new science concepts therefore becomes an interlocking 
cognitive ‘see-saw’ where both readout strategies and the causal net are said to co-evolve. These 
authors suggest: “There should be episodes of ‘conceptual bootstrapping’, where causal 
assumptions drive the learning of new readout strategies. On other occasions, ‘noticings’ - for 
example, that something surprisingly affects something else - may drive reformulations in the 
causal net. In general, characteristics of one will have important influences on how the other 
behaves and develops” (p. 1177). 
Definition of conceptual change. Hence diSessa and Sherin (1998) define conceptual 
change as involving both the separate changes in readout strategies and in the causal net. They 
clarify by showing an example, that it is possible that no new readout strategies are necessary in 
learning a new coordination class, rather existing ones come to be organized and used 
differently. On the causal net side, maybe the construction of a whole new causal net may be 
required, or an existing one may need to be developed and reorganized. 
Importance of the model. The detail provided relating to the activity of the coordination 
classes is an important feature of this model. The suggestion that conceptual change is a two-part 
process in which conscious attending to evidence (e.g., data) followed by conscious attending to 
the explanations related to causation (e.g., personal theories) is a development and clarification 
on Vosniadou’s concerns with “metaconceptual awareness”.  In fact, diSessa and Sherin propose 
that the causal net is the source of difficulty in learning school physics. Their recommendation is 
thus, “among other things, it [the causal net] needs to become more systematically organized. 
The notions of invariance and integration may play a role in the organization and selection of 
causal net to be used” (diSessa & Sherin, 1998, p. 1178).  
It is arguable that missing from this model is the answer to the question: What kinds of 
changes occur in the causal net? In other words, if we are to attend to new causation what is 
needed to fill in this gap? To address this question we must turn to Chi’s views on a theory of 
conceptual change for an answer. 
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2.2 Chi’s Ontological Reassignment Theory 
 
2.2.1 Evolution of Ontologically-based Conceptual Change Theory 
 The original model. Chi et al., (1994) define conceptual change as learning that changes a 
preexisting conception. This definition holds a basic assumption that the learner has some prior 
idea on knowledge of the concept, which in turn may mean that it has already been classified into 
a category. Therefore the meaning of a concept is determined by its category assignment and 
conceptual change is defined as a change in category assignment. On the other hand, the simpler 
process of “belief revision”, according to Chi (1992, 1997), occurs when the concept just needs 
an adjustment to the category (an addition or deletion of information). Accordingly, the most 
important aspect of Chi’s theory of conceptual change is this notion of re-assignment of concept 
from the initial category in the ontological tree to the veridical category of the tree. The way the 
categories in one tree differ from categories in another is embedded in their ontological 
attributes.  
 Chi’s theory of conceptual change (Chi et al., 1994; Chi & Slotta, 1993) rests on three 
assumptions: (1) an epistemological assumption concerning the ontological assignment and 
beliefs about the nature of entities in the world5, thereby defining the criterion of “different”; (2) 
a metaphysical assumption concerning the nature of certain scientific concepts (a position that 
we contend sets Chi apart from other theorists inasmuch as she takes an outside-looking-in 
approach that perhaps is related to her research on expertise); and, (3) a psychological 
                                                 
5 There is a long tradition of theorizing about ontological categories based on predictability or use of predicates in natural 
languages. Keil (1979) describes the term predictability as follows: “it determines which classes of predicates can be sensibly 
combined with which classes of terms, and it appears to involve hierarchical organization in that a predicate P1 may be sensibly 
combined with a superset of the set of terms that can be sensibly combined with a predicate P2” (p. 11). Therefore an ontological 
category would be defined by the set of terms for which a particular set of predicates could be applied to and the statements 
judged to be true or false. Predicates used in such a manner that the statements cannot be judged to be veridical or fallacious, 
suggest that the terms do not belong to the same ontological category. An examples that are often cited would be that of colour. 
The predicate “is green” may apply to “the frog” (natural kind) or to “the table” (artifact) or to “the girl” (natural kind). Because 
these can be proven true or false, however, “is green” cannot be with “an hour” in any sensible way except metaphorically. Keil 
states, “a predicate spans a term if and only if that predicate-term combination makes sense and can be assigned a truth value, 
which can be either true or false (p. 11). 
 This paper will not delve further into the discussion of predictability and the assumption that it can identify different 
ontological categories. It will suffice to say that the study of this topic is covered by Sommer’s theory of the relation between 
predicates and terms, which represent a class of terms leading to differential ontological categories membership (Sommer, 1963; 
cited in Keil, 1979, p. 15 see figure).  
 Thus, a primary assumption of this study is that natural kinds and artifacts belong to distinct different ontological categories, 
which can be identified through a term-predicate relationship. However, it would be difficult to suggest the same rigid test could 
hold true for the ontological category of processes, which Chi has identified. This should not negate the fact that processes fall 
under different rules of operation and therefore can be considered to belong to different ways of understanding the world, hence, 
different ontological categories. Since there is little literature in this domain, we will base this statement on the work in 
complexity that uses a different mode of operation for certain phenomena (referring to statements made by Jim Kaput, Uri 
Wilensky, and others at symposium on Complex Systems in Education, presentation at AERA, April 2002). 
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assumption concerning the learner’s naïve conceptions and miscategorization of concepts that 
are revealed in a propositional context (i.e., mental models). 
 
2.2.2 Recent Refinements to the Theory 
Two major changes have appeared in Chi’s description of this conceptual change theory. 
The first relates to the difficulty in removing misconceptions, the second to the structure of the 
categories. 
Reconceptualization on removing of misconceptions. In her most recent publications 
(e.g., Chi & Roscoe, 2002), Chi clarifies her stance on the structures of concepts as embedded in 
naïve theories. Furthermore, she explicitly acknowledges the assumptions that naïve theories and 
scientific theories are often incommensurate; a statement similar to diSessa and Sherin (1998). 
Her most important conjecture, however, is that the major challenge in conceptual change comes 
from the fact that “students may lack awareness of when they need to shift [to an alternative 
ontological category], and may lack an alternative category to shift to” (Chi & Roscoe, 2002, p. 
18). These authors postulate that in fact the lack of the scientifically appropriate category 
(emergent processes) prevents students from requisite recategorization: “students cannot repair 
misconceptions if conceptual shift is not possible. This is what makes certain misconceptions 
more difficult to repair than others” (p.19).  
How then does one gain awareness of or access to these new categories? This is the major 
question posed by Chi (2000b), and Chi and Roscoe (2002); and, this is the major question that 
we have focused on in this study.  
As described earlier, empirical studies using the anomalous data confrontation models 
have produced equivocal results relying on constructivist instructional strategies to bolster the 
potency of the treatment. Limón, (2001) states:  
Despite the positive effects we have reported, perhaps the most outstanding result of the 
studies using the cognitive conflict strategy is the lack of efficacy for students to achieve 
a strong restructuring and, consequently, a deep understanding of the new information. 
Sometimes, partial changes are achieved, but in some cases they disappear in a short 
period of time after the instructional intervention. Why are students so resistant to change 
even when they are aware of contradiction? Why are students able to partially modify 
their beliefs and theories but keep the core of their initial theory? (p. 364).  
 
This shortcoming of confrontation is exactly what Chi and Roscoe (2002) believe is 
averted when conceptual change is approached from the perspective of reassignment. Perhaps an 
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answer to Limón’s first question, and maybe even the second, is indicated in their statement: 
“The problem is that unless students have an alternate category to reassign the concept to, such 
instruction [presentation of anomalous data] will not be effective” (Chi & Roscoe, 2002, p. 19).  
 
Therefore, where do we start? Initial questions are: Do novice science students possess 
the suitable alternative ontological categories? If they already possess the needed alternative 
category, does a shift in explanation require mere facilitation or does it require knowledge 
reorganization? If this category does not already exist, then can we teach them about this 
category? How can this be accomplished, what do they learn, and how long does it take? Finally, 
if there is a change, is it long lasting? These are the primary questions that this study elects to 
address. 
2.2.3 Summary of the Ontological Reassignment Theory 
In 1993 Chi and Slotta compared their model of conceptual change to diSessa’s (1993b) 
model of concept formation. They concurred then that there were several points of reconciliation 
between the two models. For instances, the role played by p-prims could be viewed as low-level 
instantiation of the category reasoning process. Continuing, they point to several specific points 
of agreement such as: (1) intuitive knowledge is phenomenological in the sense of it being 
personal empirical knowledge; (2) retrieval of intuitive knowledge is driven largely by surface 
features; and, (3) while intuitive knowledge is primitive and requires no explanation, it forms the 
basis of high-level reasoning about physical processes. However, there were and still are 
irreconcilable differences between diSessa and others regarding the structure of intuitive 
knowledge6. For example, Chi and Vosniadou view intuitive knowledge as coherent “theories”, 
while diSessa’s view is that intuitive knowledge is fragmented, “knowledge in pieces”.  
Although this difference is significant, Chi’s recent focus on causation draws the two 
models closer. It is reasonable to therefore put forward the proposition that the “coordination 
class” may be a representation of an ontological category since it acts as the control mechanism 
regulating the two phases of concept acquisition – readout strategies (what we unconsciously 
choose to ‘see’ of the world) and causal nets (how consciously we explain what we ‘see’). 
Furthermore, the ontological frame required to explain many scientific concepts is really an 
                                                 
6 Observed in a verbal debate between Andrea diSessa and Stella Vosniadou (AERA Annual Meeting, New Orleans, 
2002).  
 22
explanation or attribution of different types of “causation”. The bringing together of the two 
theories was not the focus of this research, nonetheless, further mention will be made in the 
discussion section of this paper. Finally, it is plausible to propose that Vosniadou’s model, 
although not focused on causation, suggests that some types of conceptual change may be 
intentional and call for effortful attending to metacognitive processes in the form of 
metaconceptual awareness. This possible connection between intentional learning (e.g., 
metacognitive and metaconceptual awareness, motivation, and epistemological beliefs) and 
conceptual change is a primary focus of the recent publication edited by Sinatra and Pintrich 
(2002). Although this aspect of conceptual change is not directly manipulated in this study, the 
important role of intentional reflection in the form of metacognitive activities and 
metaconceptual awareness was observed in the learners’ during the intervention. 
 
2.3 Ontologically-based Misconceptions  
 
Before proceeding, it is important to evaluate Chi’s assertion that many important 
misconceptions are ontologically based. Hence a question to be answered was: Is there empirical 
evidence from the literature of ontological category-like misconceptions?  
There are hundreds of reported cases of different types of scientific misconceptions 
(Driver, 1995; Pfundt & Duit, 1994). Some are trivial in that they require simple restructuring of 
information, however, the ones that are discussed in conceptual change literature tend to fit with 
and support Chi’s ontological supposition. To illustrate this point, we present a sample of studies 
in the following section from a variety of disciplines and sources. 
 
2.3.1 Misconceptions on the Topic of Evolution 
 There is a substantial body of literature describing the difficulties involved in changing 
students’ misconceptions in the learning of evolution (Ferrari & Chi, 1998; Jacobson & 
Archodidou, 2000). The problems range from the understanding of the time frames (e.g., Renner, 
Brumby, & Shepherd, 1981), to genetics (e.g., Demastes, Good, & Peebles, 1995; Jensen & 
Finley, 1996), to the distinctions between species and individuals (e.g., Hallden, 1988), the origin 
and survival of new traits, the role of variation within a population, and evolution as the 
changing proportion of individuals with distinct traits in a population (Bishop & Anderson, 
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1990;), to the explanation of spontaneous genetic mutation (Settlage, 1994), the evolutionary 
changes supposedly occurring as a result of need (Brumby, 1984), and finally failure to 
recognize that many aspects of evolution exhibit “equilibration-type” processes as opposed to 
“event-type” processes (Ferrari & Chi, 1998). Therefore a host of attributions ranging from those 
about teleological beliefs to those about isomorphic behaviors between levels is represented in 
these studies of difficulties in conceptualization.  
 
2.3.2 Chemical Equilibrium, Diffusion, and Osmosis Misconceptions 
 The literature concerned with the instruction of chemistry has identified a persistent 
misconception about chemical equilibrium (e.g., Suits, 2000; Coll, R.K. & Treagust, D.F., 2002). 
These misconceptions appear to stem from misunderstanding of the differential levels of 
operations, as well as the different symbolic representations, that are discussed in the course of a 
normal chemistry lecture (Barnerjee, 1995). On the related topic of osmosis and diffusion, there 
is also evidence that similar misconceptions exist (e.g., Odom, A.L., 1995; Sanger, M. J., 
Brecheisen, D.M., & Hynek, B.M., 2001). Again the attributions of isomorphic behaviors 
between levels as well as assumed static behaviors once equilibrium is achieved are common 
themes. These empirical studies lend support to Chi’s conjecture that there is an ontological base 
to this class of science misconception.  
 
2.3.3 Deterministic Causality Misconceptions 
 From the literature on judgment and decision-making, evidence suggests that both adults 
and children exhibit difficulty reasoning about uncertainty with greater tendencies to attribute 
deterministic outcomes in problem solving (e.g., Shaughnessy, 1992; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). It is arguable that the findings from studies relating to mathematics and statistics may not 
cross over to problems encountered in other domains of science; however, this is not the case 
with attributions of determinism. According to Metz (1998): “Without an understanding of 
randomness and probability, formal study in statistics can have little meaning, and informal 
[mis]interpretations of patterns and variability in the world around us will frequently result in 
spurious causal attributions” (p. 286). The latter assertion is precisely the one that supports this 
dimension to the ontological category of emergent phenomena.  
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 Another interpretation of randomness and probability. In this study we use the terms 
randomness and probability in ways that may be unfamiliar to the lay person. For instances, 
randomness is an important behavior that accounts for much of the variety and requisite error 
observed an emergent phenomena (see Bar Yam, 1997). With regard to probabilistic behaviors, 
they occur as the interactions of the multiple agents, and systems, producing stochastic outcomes 
thereby making causal mechanisms more complex.  
 Even using these descriptions of randomness and probability there is evidence of 
misconceptions (Wilensky, 1993; 1995; 1997). The early work from the MIT labs (Wilensky & 
Resnick, 1995; Wilensky & Resnick, 1999) suggested that conceptions of randomness as being 
destructive are prevalent in non-scientific reasoning. Furthermore, there is abundant evidence 
that people have difficulty reasoning about parallelism7 and probability. Resnick and Wilensky 
have thus argued, together and independently, that these misconceptions be considered the 
“deterministic/centralized mindset”(further elaboration to follow).  
 
2.3.4 A Global Perspective on Ontologically-based Misconception 
 Spiro and his colleagues (Feltovich, Coulsen, Spiro, & Adami, 1992; Spiro, Coulson, 
Feltovich and Anderson, 1988; Spiro, Feltovich, Jacobson, & Coulson, 1992) have identified a 
range of misconceptions exhibited by medical students. One of the common attributions they 
identified in learners, even in advance stages of learning, was the tendency to adopt a reductive 
approach to problem solving; in addition to oversimplification of the subject matter. They 
identified three biases: “[1] additivity  bias, in which parts of complex entities that have been 
studied in isolation are assumed to retain their characteristics when the parts are reintegrated into 
the whole from which they were drawn; [2] discreteness bias, in which continuously 
dimensioned attributes (like length) are bifurcated to their poles and continuous processes are 
instead segmented into discrete steps; and [3] compartmentalization bias, in which conceptual 
elements that are in reality highly interdependent are instead treated in isolation, missing 
important aspects of their interaction”  (Spiro et al., 1992, p. 26).  
If we examine the biases individually, they can be matched to the naïve attributions listed 
above. Hence, the “additivity bias” may also be described as attributions of isomorphic behaviors 
                                                 
7 “Parallelism” refers to the simultaneous operations of multiple agents/objects all programmed to do the same 
thing. Complex systems operate in this manner therefore simulations are a good way to represent this type of 
functioning. 
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between levels (reductive or non-emergent behaviors). While the “discreteness bias” shows signs 
of attributions of static outcomes or beginning end processes. Finally the “compartmentalization 
bias” may be related to the global lack of awareness of emergent properties.  
Latest developments. Jacobson’s (2000) research identified specific categories of 
attributions that differentiate expert and novice reasoning about emergent phenomena. These 
categories will be described in the methods; however, for the moment it is sufficient to state that 
these categories support the data described above as well as Chi’s ontological dimensions.  
 
2.3.5 Summary of Ontologically-based Misconceptions 
In summary, we argue that these studies provide some reasonable confirmation of the 
articulated interpretation of the ontological categories described by Chi (2000). Furthermore, 
although Spiro et al. (1992) research (i.e., Cognitive Flexibility Theory, CFT) addressed 
difficulties associated with advanced knowledge acquisition,  CFT may also apply to challenges 
faced in the removal of robust science misconceptions. For these reasons, we borrowed from the 
recommendations made by that theory to design the instructional intervention used in this current 
study. 
 
2.4 The Alternative Causal Ontological Category 
  
If a possible solution to the removal of robust misconceptions is the reassignment to an 
alternative ontological category, then what are the problems associated with the learning of such 
categories? Before attempting to answer this question, however, we must first define what is 
meant by the ontological category of emergent causal processes, and describe why they 
constitute a ‘different’ causal explanation. 
Chi and her colleagues have spent the past decade describing this category using a variety 
of terms: “events” (Chi, 1992), “acausal interactions” Chi and Slotta (1993), “constraint-based 
interactions” (Chi, Slotta & deLeeuw, 1994; Slotta, Chi & Joram, 1995; Slotta & Chi, 1996), 
“equilibration” processes (Chi, 1997; Ferrari & Chi, 1998; Slotta & Chi, 1999), “CDS” (Chi, 
2000b), and currently “emergent” processes (Chi & Roscoe, 2002). This latest naming is the 
most parsimonious and consistent with the existing literature on the processes that Chi has 
described for years using those varied terms.  Although Chi has not acknowledged the body of 
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literature from the field of complex systems, and indeed even distances herself from it (Chi, 
2000b), her latest writing (Chi & Roscoe, 2002) brings her closer than ever before to affirming a 
reasonable connection. 
 
2.4.1 Emergent Processes 
 In order to describe the emergent processes ontological category we first turn to the 
literature that describes it best: that is, complexity and complex systems theory.  Born out of 
disciplines such as biology, cybernetics, mathematics, statistical mechanics, and quantum 
physics, the theories related to the phenomena of complexity are undeniably daunting. 
Nonetheless, the ability of these theories to explain the behaviors of countless biological, 
chemical, physical and social interactions requires that we take a serious look at their potency as 
representational structures in our curricula. 
 
Genesis of Interest in the Topic  
Kauffman (1995) identifies complexity as the state at which a system of many coupled 
components is “orderly enough to ensure stability, yet full of flexibility and surprise” (p. 87). He 
continues to describe this state as one, which is just near phase transition and referred to as the 
“edge of chaos”.  One might assume from these beginnings that the study of complexity should 
be reserved for biologists and mathematicians; however, there is another side to this area of 
study. It is the conceptual side of complexity where the behaviors of countless phenomena, 
including social, economic, cognitive, and scientific, can be explained using the global structural 
features of complex systems. 
Waldrop (1992), a science writer, confirms in his book entitled Complexity that at 
present the field is still poorly defined as researchers grapple with questions that cut across the 
traditional disciplines. This observation may also apply to the terms used to define the field. 
Some researchers refer to it as the study of complex systems, or complex adaptive systems, while 
others identify it as the study of self-organizing systems, and some as emergent systems. These 
differences should not be viewed as weaknesses, rather, as a sign of the newness of the area. 
Indeed, it is difficult to describe individual behaviors of complex systems because of their 
interconnected nature. In an attempt to keep the different terminology to a minimum, in this 
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current study we will define the term “complex systems”8 to refer to both complex adaptive 
systems as well as complex non-adaptive systems unless the adaptive nature is essential to 
describing the system. Additionally, the term emergence or emergent properties/behaviors of 
systems is used as the exemplification of the characteristic displayed by some types of complex 
systems as well as the product of self-organization.  
What is emergence ? A simple explanation of emergence is a phenomenon wherein the 
interaction of a system’s parts results in a higher order organization which behaves differently 
from what one could predict from knowledge of the parts alone. Hence, the commonly known 
cliché “the whole is greater than the sum of the parts” is an apt description. 
Emergence, however, is anything but simple to describe or to understand. In an effort to 
explain the phenomenon, we turn to two authors, John Holland and Yaneer Bar-Yam, who each 
have written extensively on the subject. Holland (1998) describes emergence as patterns of 
interactions that persist despite a continual turnover in the constituents of the patterns. In an 
effort to make the concept more accessible, Holland uses a metaphor of a checkers game where 
the rules are invariant but the outcome of the interactions are varied and never dull, particularly 
in the hands of skilled players. Accordingly, it is difficult to make predictions about behaviors of 
emergent systems even when the rules and initial states are specified. A difficulty that is 
compounded when the system is composed of mechanisms that allow for adaptation and 
learning; that is, overt internal models with lookahead protocols (these well be discussed more 
fully later on). Nonetheless, over time both adaptive and nonadaptive emergent systems exhibit 
recurring patterns that are discerned by attending to specific details. Therefore, such patterns are 
an important property of emergent systems and can be used to characterize them without 
reference to underlying strata. 
Bar-Yam (1997) describes emergence as the behavior that arises in the collective that is 
not exhibited in the behavior of the parts (nor would arise from a simple summation of 
behaviors). He is quick to point out that although the collective behavior is not readily 
understood from the behavior of the parts, this should not be taken to mean that the collective 
                                                 
8 Definition of complex systems: A system is a hierarchically organized collection of a large number of coupled components 
defined by stated boundaries. The smallest unit of a system is referred to as an agent. Complex systems are a category of systems 
characterized by highly interacting individual agents operating under specified rules resulting in emergence of meta-agents and/or 
systems that exhibit differential behaviors to their component agents. Complex systems may be of the adaptive type (e.g., human 
beings, the immune system, viruses, etc.), which form internal models that learn and evolve over time or the nonadaptive type, 
which does not exhibit adaptive qualities (e.g., molecules, galaxies, etc.). 
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behavior is not “contained in the behavior of the parts if they are studied in the context in which 
they are found” (p.10). This subtlety leads to a distinction between two types of emergent 
behaviors, local emergence and global emergence. Local emergence implies that taking a small 
part out of a large system would result in little change to the properties of the small part or the 
properties of the larger system. Examples of this would be water droplets that contain the 
properties of water regardless of how small a quantity of water we look at (e.g., one molecule of 
H20 has no fluidity). In contrast, global emergent properties invest greater interdependence of 
parts. For instance, an emergent traffic jam that propagates backwards despite the forward 
motion of the individual cars; or the parts of the brain, or a corporation that are different in situ 
compared to their isolated parts. Hence, a small part cannot be studied outside of the larger 
system and still exhibit the properties it has when embedded in the whole system.  
Operationally defining emergence.  Although Bar-Yam (1997) points to important 
distinctions in the phenomenon of emergence as part of the study of complexity, for the purpose 
of this discussion, we selected the more general description that views a system’s emergent 
properties as patterns or recurring structures resulting from non-linear interactions, of lower level 
parts (agents), governed by specific rules and relationships. These rules and relationships are the 
mechanisms that afford emergence, which is the resultant state of coupling all the lesser 
processes of self-organization/aggregation, nonlinearity, stochastic behavior, tagging/selection, 
flows of information. Consequently, emergence is the topmost attribute of the selected system 
that uses the mechanisms of self-organization9 to produce the emergent outcome.  
 
 
                                                 
9 Self-organization (as well as the process of selection) is so pervasive in nature that Kauffman (1995), one of the first scholars to 
write about the subject, likened it to universal laws. In his book At Home in the Universe, he builds an argument to explain how 
these processes made “the emergence of life well-nigh inevitable” (p.43). Waldrop (1993) describes self-organization as a 
process wherein “groups of agents seeking mutual accommodation and self-consistency somehow manage to transcend 
themselves, acquiring collective properties such as life, thought, and purpose that they might never have possessed individually” 
(p.11). Does this mean that self-organization is part of emergence? Yes, as agents go through the process of self-organization, 
there is an emergent meta-agent created as described in the previous paragraphs.  
 In explaining principles of self-organization particularly in developmental biology, Bar Yam touches on an essential quality 
in understanding the beauty of this process, that is, its economy. Self-organization is a process in which the representation 
describes the developmental process of formation rather than the final system itself. It is thus the creation of an algorithm from 
which the system is to arise. Another parsimonious property is that randomness or noise acts as a bonus to the unfolding of the 
algorithm in that it adds the element of chance variation without breaking the reproduction value. For further information we 
direct the reader to Bar-Yam’s book. 
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2.5 Challenges of Teaching and Learning Emergent Causal Processes 
 
Why do concepts related to the emergent processes category prove challenging to 
learners? Chi (2000) suggests three possible challenges to the removal of misconceptions: (1) the 
nature of human cognition, (2) nature of instruction, and (3) students’ lack of awareness about 
the nature of emergent processes.  
 
Nature of Human Cognition  
To support this conjecture, Chi cites two separate sources. First, she turns to Wilson and 
Keil (2000) who posit that humans are predisposed to think simplistically in causal terms (see p.5 
this document, as well as diSessa’s explanation of the role of causal nets, for other support of this 
argument). Second, she suggests that in normal cognitive development and learning, rarely are 
ontological shifts required. In fact, our naive theories do not often fail to explain the world. This 
claim is supported by the ontological category formation literature (Keil, 1979; Sommers, 1963). 
Furthermore, concept formation theorists such as Margolis (1999) suggest that we may mistake a 
paper bag (nominal kind/artifact) for an animal (natural kind) at a distance but it is soon rectified 
when given a second look or more time to process the information. We may also need to shift 
within ontological categories such as reassigning the concept ‘whale’ from the category of ‘fish’ 
to the category of ‘mammal’. It is argued that we already possess the category of ‘mammal’, 
therefore the shift is a smooth one. The same may even be said of Vosniadou’s study of children 
who eventually shift the concept of Earth from that of a flat object to one that is spherical and 
rotates around the sun (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1994). Although interesting, these sorts of category 
shifts are outside the scope of this current study. 
 
The Nature of Instruction  
The second challenge involved with this category is identified as the problems of 
textbook structuring of science content. Chi (2000) identified the following weaknesses: (1) too 
much emphasis on macro level processes, therefore micro level actions are described in terms of 
classes of individuals rather than interactions and collective effects; (2) lack of emphasis on how 
macro level patterns emerge from micro level interactions; (3) insufficient emphasis on emergent 
processes; finally, (4) inadequate attention and direction concerning when differential strategies 
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are required for problem solving. These problems too are outside the scope of this current study, 
however, the instructional intervention developed for this current study was sensitive to these 
concerns and referred to in the discussion section.  
 
2.5.1 Overcoming Lack of Awareness of Emergent Processes 
Chi (2000) argues that emergent processes are difficult to pinpoint because they are 
intertwined with [linear] causal processes. She also suggests that it is difficult because for 
everyday practical purposes the world is seen as functioning in a [linear] causal fashion. “Thus, 
the adequacy of operating at the phenomena level in an everyday world, coupled with the 
absence of any conflicting feedback from such an operation (such as closing the window to keep 
the heat out), prevents the students from being aware that their interpretation is limited at some 
deeper level. Without such knowledge and feedback, there is no motivation for students to seek 
an alternative [nonlinear] explanation” (Chi, 2000b, p.24).  
 Further support of this conjecture comes from Resnick and Wilensky who have argued, 
together and independently, that such misconceptions be considered to constitute the 
“deterministic/centralized mindset” (Resnick, 1994; Resnick & Wilensky, 1995; Wilensky & 
Resnick, 1999). They posit that attending to a single level of description, rather than the 
connections among levels, constrains our ability to correctly explain emergent patterns of 
behavior in both physical, chemical, and human organizational processes (e.g., birds flocking, 
gas equilibration, traffic jams). They assert that a possible explanation for this predilection is our 
commanding but myopic human experience as “active planning and designing agents in the 
world. Yet most of the natural world is composed of agents with much smaller capacities – 
agents that do not have enough neuronal capacity to conceive of a plan or enough bandwidth to 
communicate it to conspecifics.” (Wilensky, 2001, p. 3). Adding to this argument, is a common 
tendency to anthropomorphize these behaviors, perhaps because of our limited experience with 
these types of agents, or perhaps because of an innate psychological behavior left over from 
childhood where human traits are used to explain inanimate objects (Vosniadou, 1989). 
 Yet another possible weakness of human cognition is our inability to reason about 
multiple operations of very large numbers of entities. Wilensky (2001) states: “Because of our 
experience as agents and our inability to attend to large numbers of factors or long periods of 
 31
time, we do not usually have significant opportunities to develop robust intuitions about how 
emergent phenomena arise and maintain themselves” (p.3). 
 
2.5.2 Summary of Identified Challenges to Learning About Emergent Processes  
 To summarize, Chi (2000) identifies three inter-related barriers to understanding the 
ontological category of emergence. First, novice learners treat macro level behavior as the linear 
sum of causal events (lack of nonlinearity understanding). Second, learners fail to consider the 
interactions between agents at the micro level (lack of local interactions understanding). Third, 
learners fail to understand that the macro level emergent behavior is the result of the collective 
interaction of agents and environment - “interactions in dynamic collections” (lack of emergent 
process).  
 Resnick’s and Wilensky’s work, together and independently, have echoed these three 
common limitations of understanding and have added to the list the constraints of the 
deterministic and centralized mindset that guides our thinking and reasoning about emergent 
phenomena (Resnick, 1994; Wilensky & Resnick, 1995; Wilensky, 1993; 1995; 1997; Wilensky 
& Resnick, 1999). Additionally, recent work by Wilensky’s team (Stieff & Wilensky, 2002) 
supports that still another limitation, the over-attribution of static properties, appears to be a 
contributor to learning about emergent processes. 
 These studies, along with Jacobson’s (2000) expert-novice categorization, support the 
contention that non-scientific attributions may be articulated into the following six categories of 
habitual assumptions, and studied as such: 
• Isomorphic behavior at both macro and micro levels (i.e., reductive bias or non-
awareness of emergence); 
• Centralized control assumption; 
• Single causal explanation of macro-level behavior from micro-level interactions (i.e., 
additive, linear); 
• Determinacy assumption;  
• Intentionality (i.e., teleological, anthropomorphic); and, 
• Static outcomes to processes assumption (e.g., beginning-end processes). 
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2.6 The Status of Research on the Teaching of Emergence and Complexity 
 
 
At least two major questions rise out of the body of literature described above. One is 
explicitly theory based and relates to the practical efficacy of Chi’s model of conceptual change. 
The second is related to the instructional strategies that may lead to the development of 
understanding emergent causation. In essence, two practical questions may be posed: First, can 
experiential training related to the emergent ontological category facilitate conceptual change 
(conceptual change defined as a shift in causal explanations)? Second, how else can we come to 
learn and think about complex systems emergence? 
 
2.6.1 An Empirical Study on Teaching Emergence 
So far, the only empirical study which supports Chi’s theoretical account of conceptual 
change was conducted by Slotta and Chi (1999). Slotta examined the effects of a training unit 
composed of a self-designed computer simulation of dynamic systems related to the diffusion of 
gases. Using a pretest and posttest experimental design, Slotta randomly assigned 24 university 
undergraduates with no science background to one of two treatment conditions (experimental 
and control). There were two sessions of approximately two hours each. The first session 
presented the ontological training module while the second was intended to provide the science 
content, transfer material. The training module consisted of computer simulation and text 
covering four attributes of air expansion and liquid diffusion considered to be an example of 
“equilibration processes”: (1) no clear cause and effect explanations, (2) system of interacting 
components moving towards equilibrium, (3) combined effects of many smaller processes 
occuring simulataneously and independently, and (4) no beginning or ending of the process. 
During the training sessions prompts were used to ensure that students were paying attention to 
the important parts of the text.  
After the training session the subjects were administered both near (air expansion and 
diffusion questions) and far transfer (predator-prey populations) questions to determine their 
comprehension of the text and asked to apply the four newly learned attributes to these questions. 
The test items were muliple choice “problems” on the subject of electric current based on 
previous work by Slotta et al. (1995).  
 33
The control group received the same content on diffusion but no ontological training. The 
next phase of the experiment provided the students with specially prepared text on electricity 
based on a conventional physics textbook but with the water analogies removed. The 
experimental group was cued to transfer by being told: “they would be reading about another 
example of an equilibration process” (p. 21).  
Results from the experimental group showed significant pretest and posttest gains F(1,22) 
= 6.8, p = 0.02. In order to tease out the differences between those who understood the material 
from those who did not, the experimental group was split into high and low scorers on the 
training posttest. The interaction of test scores with this group was also significant, F(2, 21) = 
13.8, p  = 0.00. Further sorting of the data provided better explanations of the findings, which 
revealed that students’ improvement in problem solving was directly dependent on their 
understanding of the training. 
Slotta also collected verbal protocol data, which was analyzed using the predicate 
analysis technique developed in Slotta et al. (1995). Novice explanations included the following 
substance predicates: moves, supplied, qualified, rest, absorbed, consumed. He also identified six 
expert predicates: system-wide, movement process, uniform state, equilibrium state, 
simultaneity, and interdependence. The comparison of pretest posttest use of predicates also 
supported a change due to the training. There was a significant increase in the process predicates 
F(1,10) = 31.04, p = 0.000 with a decrease in the substance predicates F(1,10) = 20.17, p = 
0.001. A further refinement in the analysis revealed the same clarification between those who 
understood the training material and their shift of explanation to the process based ontology. 
Slotta concluded by stating that:  
 
Thus, a seemingly tangential training about an ontological category has yielded dramatic 
results in terms of qualitative reasoning (problem solving and explanations) in another 
domain (in electricity concepts) that reflects ‘far transfer’ or deep conceptual change  
(Slotta & Chi, 1999, p. 29). 
 
 
2.6.2 Using Models to Teach about Emergent Causation 
Papert (1980) asserts that our culture is rich in pairs, couples, and one-to-one 
relationships, however, it is poor in publicized models of systemic procedures. In fact, he states: 
“Anything is easy if you can assimilate it to your collection of models. If you can’t, anything can 
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be painfully difficult” (Papert, 1980, p. vii). Models, specially computer-based models (e.g., 
exploratory modeling at described by Wilensky & Resnick, 1999) have proven to be powerful at 
reifying certain concepts and thereby supporting certain types of learning. Details of three such 
studies are presented below.  
 
2.6.3 Using Physical Models to Teach About Complex Systems 
Hmelo et al. (2000) studied 6th grade students’ understanding of the respiratory system 
using an intervention in which students built partial working models of the lungs. This study 
shed light on the many affordances for promoting deep learning of systems. They adopted a 
Structure Behavior Function model to both describe the system as well as to code the learners’ 
mental models (based on SBF theory - posited by Goel & Chandrasekaran, 1989). Their results 
provided evidence that students in the experimental group had a small but significant increase in 
their attending to structural relationships. Their understanding also became more rich, 
demonstrated by the number of relationships mentioned and their thinking of how the system 
worked. However, the students did not mention function as frequently and mentioned behavior 
least of all. These results were not unexpected, in fact, these researchers anticipated that the 
causal behaviors would be more difficult to observe because they happen at an invisible level 
and involved the understanding of dynamic relationships.   
Their research is significant because it provides evidence that supports the contention that 
understanding of complex systems’ behavior is possible even by 6th graders.  Moreover, it 
confirms the value of instructional tools with greater affordances for demonstrating emergent 
processes.  
 
2.6.4 Computer Based Modeling Environments 
As previously stated, the research teams of Wilensky and Resnick have conducted many 
qualitative studies of the affordances realized by different versions of their multi-agent modeling 
languages (StarLogo, Resnick, 1994; StarLogoT, Wilensky 1997; and the subsequent simulation 
models of NetLogo, Wilensky, 1999; and, currently ChemLogo). Although the study described 
below took place after my research was in progress, I present it as an example of one of the few 
structured inquiries of this particular modeling tool. 
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  Stieff and Wilensky (2002) examined six undergraduate science majors’ understanding of 
the process of chemical equilibrium when using a modeling and simulation package called 
ChemLogo. This modeling environment is embedded in NetLogo, which may be considered the 
next generation derivative of StarLogo. The intervention consisted of a three-part 90-minute 
interview during which the students were asked to first explain their understanding of the Le 
Chatelier’s Principle in chemistry, then during their observations and interactions with the 
simulation explain the behavior of the molecules that were realizing the behaviors described by 
this principle; followed by the opportunity to reflect on their reasoning.  
Observations reported describe a shift from formulaic problem-solving approaches and 
rote memorization (which were exhibited in part one of the 90-minute interview), to attempts at 
conceptual reasoning and justification of answers during and after using ChemLogo. The authors 
identified four distinct categories of observed changes: (1) defining equilibrium for a chemical 
system, (2) characterizing factors affecting equilibrium, (3) transitioning between submicro-, 
micro-, and macro- levels during problem solving, and (4) fluidly moving between various forms 
of symbolic representation at all three phenomenal levels. The report featured one student’s 
(Andrew) experience and identified a change in his ability to explain and correct his predictions. 
He was able to deduce correctly how the micro-level events result in phenomena at the macro-
level, a change that provided him with greater confidence to deduce other more accurate and 
reasonable answers. 
 
2.6.5 Emergent Process Models – Life10 
Penner’s (2000) study looked at the development of four 6th graders engaged in a nine 
week after-school instruction investigating emergent properties using the computer simulation 
Life and ‘talus slope’. Using a case study approach allowed him to closely investigate the 
changes in the students’ reasoning. He focused on three issues related to how these students 
come to develop ways of thinking about emergent systems: (1) How did they achieve an 
understanding of the patterns that develop? (2) Did they recognize that no primary causal factor 
was necessary? (3) Did they come to distinguish between micro- and macro-levels of 
descriptions? (4) How did they explain the effects of small changes on the resulting 
                                                 
10 As a classical example of emergent processes from simple automaton programming, Life could be played both as 
a paper and pencil game or on the computer. 
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development? Resnick’s (1994) framework related to issues of centralized versus distributed 
control (i.e., “lead” or “seed”) were used to code the verbal protocols.  
The importance of Penner’s study was the confirmation that a formal taxonomy based on 
causal mechanisms could be used to code verbal protocols effectively (Penner (2001) used 
Resnick’s conjecture of a “lead” or “seed” attribution). Secondly some of his participants did 
begin to experience a shift toward emergent causal explanations. 
 
2.7 Main Research Questions Study 
 
To date, only one known study (Slotta & Chi, 1999) has attempted to answer the first 
question. While the second question (given below), has drawn attention from a handful of 
researchers exploring the use of modelling and simulation with varying levels of affordances to 
learn about emergence (Azevedo, Seibert, Guthrie, Cromley, Wang, & Tron, 2002; Bloom, 2001; 
Colella, 2001; Hmelo, Holton, & Kolodner, 2000; Klopfer & Colella, 2000; Klopfer & Um, 
2002; Penner, 2000; Wilensky & Resnick, 1999; Stieff & Wilensky, 2002; Wilensky, 1999; 
Wilensky & Reisman, in press; Wilensky & Stroup, 2000). In the study presented here we 
address three questions: 
 
1. Do student’s explanatory frameworks of scientific phenomena (ontological beliefs) 
change as a consequence of an instructional intervention utilizing simulations of complex 
systems (i.e., StarLogo) and supported by cognitive scaffolding? 
2. What Complex Systems concepts do students acquire during the instructional activities? 
3. What is the development of students’ systems thinking? 
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METHODS 
 
 
3.1 Research Design 
 
The study employed a longitudinal qualitative case study to investigate whether an 
instructional intervention that employed simulations facilitated the change in students’ 
explanatory frameworks of science (ontological beliefs) from a naïve “clockwork model” to a 
more expert “emergent systems model”. Subsequently, we investigated the influence of the 
instructional intervention on students’ comprehension of specific aspects of complex systems as 
shown below.  
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3.1.1 Participants 
This study engaged the theory driven sampling strategy of “purposeful” sampling 
(Creswell 2002). The subjects were selected on the basis of their ability to help the researcher 
understand conceptual change learning. Motivation and persistence were determined to be an 
important criterion and therefore subjects with high internal motivation were selected; the 
assessment of motivation was based on scores from the Learning Approach Questionnaire (LAQ) 
created by Donn (1989). The participants were nine first year Cegep Science students between 
the ages of 17 and 18 inclusive.  
3.1.2 Instructional Intervention 
The experimental intervention consisted of five one-hour sessions that involved the use of 
different StarLogo simulations: Slime, FreeGas, and Wolf-Sheep. The simulations introduced 
students to the following component characteristics of complex dynamic systems (as identified 
by a subject-matter expert):   
• The Slime simulation introduced the students to: (1) Emergent levels of organization – 
particularly through visible aggregation and pattern formation; (2) Local interaction of 
agents; (3) Dynamic homeostatic behaviors and self-organization; (4) Random action of 
agents; and (5) Small scale fluctuations lead to nonlinear effects. 
• The GasLab - FreeGas simulation introduced the students to: (1) Emergent levels of 
organization – however, the macro-level was more abstract and required an 
understanding of graphs; (2) Local interaction of agents; (3) Dynamic equilibrium and 
self-organization; (4) Probabilistic nature – particularly related to large numbers and the 
formation of “normal distributions” (Wilensky & Resnick, 1999); and (5) Small scale 
fluctuations lead to nonlinear effects. 
• The Wolf-Sheep simulation introduced students to: (1) Emergent levels of organization; 
(2) Local interaction of agents; (3) Dynamic equilibrium and self-organization; (4) Flows 
of resources (i.e., multiplier effect); and (5) Small scale fluctuations lead to nonlinear 
effects. 
 
 Over the period of five one-hour sessions, spanning a 7-week period each of the nine first 
year Cegep Science students, met individually with the coach and worked with the simulations. 
Metacognitive prompts were provided as needed.  Students were asked to explain their thinking 
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on the characteristics and behavior of both the agents (i.e., the turtles) and the resulting system; a 
product of the interactions between agents (e.g., slime mold colony, volume & pressure, or 
ecosystem). The students constructed a set of characteristics that could be identified as common 
to complex dynamic systems. 
 The objectives of the coaching were to scaffold the cognitive load of learning the 
particular aspects and behaviors of these models. Great effort was made to limit any direct 
instruction unless the participant showed a substantial lack of understanding or frustration 
(defined as periods of over 10 to 15 minutes without describing or explaining anything new, or 
taking the discussion in a completely unrelated direction). Therefore students’ observation and 
acquisition of emergent causal processes should be viewed as the outcome of self-directed 
discovery rather than direct instruction. 
 
3.1.3 Case Study Design 
Case study is a part of scientific method, but its purpose is not limited to the advance of 
science. Whereas single or a few cases are poor representation of a population of cases 
and poor grounds for advancing grand generalization, a single case as negative example 
can establish limits to grand generalization…. Case studies are of value in refining theory 
and suggesting complexities for further investigation, as well as helping to establish the 
limits of generalizability” (Stake, 1998, p. 104). 
 
 This study employed a longitudinal qualitative case study design described by Merriam 
(1999) as particularistic, descriptive, and heuristic. Particularistic, because it focuses on a 
specific instance, event, program or phenomenon; descriptive, because it results in “thick” and 
rich descriptions of the phenomenon; and, heuristic, because it sheds light on a particular 
phenomenon thereby leading on toward new meaning and relationships. These are made possible 
because of data collection techniques that employ methods such as direct observation, 
interviews, as well as written documents and artifacts produced by the learner (Patton, 1990). 
Hence, this design allowed us to focus closely on how students reason about the behaviors of a 
computer driven multi-agent modeling environment portraying different types of complex 
systems all of which display emergent causal processes. Furthermore, the inductive nature of the 
design leaned toward theoretical explanations, not limiting itself solely to straightforward 
descriptions. Finally, multiple cases were used to strengthen, validate and stabilize the findings 
(Miles and Huberman, 1984). 
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One of the key limitations of case study design is the sensitivity and integrity of the 
investigator (Merriam, 1998). Because of limited opportunities for training, and the close 
proximity of observer and observed, there may be unintentional bias and loss of perspective. 
Merriam (1998) reminds us that since the researcher is both the primary instrument of data 
collection and the primary data analysts, attention and accounting for bias is important. Lastly, 
but not least, in all such research designs ethical considerations must be addressed. Guba and 
Lincoln (1981, cited in Merriam, 1998) tell us that case writers can make the data say anything 
they may want. Therefore, both the reader and the authors must be wary of these biases and look 
for alternative explanations and possible externally imposed agendas; particularly, in policy 
making, socially and politically driven case study research.   
 
Methods of Data Analysis 
According to Merriam (1998), there are three main methods of analyzing qualitative data: 
(1) descriptive accounting of findings, (2) category constructions, and (3) theorizing; whereas 
Yin (1994) suggests two general strategies: (1) the descriptive framework, and (2) the 
development of theoretical propositions. Although using different words, both authors suggest 
that the descriptive level is the less in-depth analytical technique. At the descriptive level 
meaning is conveyed through the compression and linking of data, which is then presented in a 
narrative format. Most case studies generate some type of narrative presentation, however, many 
strive for the more sophisticated method of analysis involving the construction of categories or 
themes that captures recurring patterns flowing throughout the data. To emphasize this point, 
Merriam (1998) states: “category construction is data analysis” (p. 180).  
 
Methods of constructing data categories. Categories are not the data themselves; rather 
they are abstractions derived in both a systematic and intuitive manner. Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) suggest that the categories should be “emergent” (this meaning should not be confused 
with the way “emergent” has been used thus far in this study); that is, they should be born out of 
the data and in so doing be a perfect fit thereby explaining most of the data collected. Categories 
may also be considered lenses through which the data may be viewed. In many instances, 
including this current study, categories are informed by the purpose of the study as well as the 
literature.  
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Methods of constructing “themes”. The next level of data analysis is more abstract and 
involves the construction of explanations through the linking of categories. In case study 
research, this is considered the cross-case analysis. Merriam’s (1998) description of this process 
is consistent with the qualitative post-positivist movement. By comparison, Yin’s (1994) is 
reminiscent of the quantitative approaches suggesting the identification of dependent and 
independent variables. Whichever approach is selected, Yin tells us that “the analysis of case 
study evidence is one of the least developed and most difficult aspects of doing case studies” (p. 
102). This current research viewed this challenge of constructing themes and testing the links 
between categories as an important part of the data analysis.   
 
Establishing Validity (i.e., Trustworthiness and Authenticity)  
Different authors suggest that validity of case studies should be established through a 
variety of methods (Erickson, 1986; Patton, 1990; Merriam, 1998; Yin, 1994). These include: (1) 
the collection of different data sources thereby allowing for the cross-validation of findings (i.e., 
triangulation);  (2) the use of two or more evaluators to review material and make independent 
judgments and interpretations (i.e., inter-rater reliability); (3) an adequate amount of data 
collected over an adequate amount of time to provide a range of cases (i.e., confirming and 
disconfirming cases); and (4) accuracy of facts and interpretation of data evaluated by the cases 
themselves. 
 
3.2 Data Collection, Coding, and Analysis of the Three Outcome Measures 
 
In accordance with Patton’s (1990) recommendation, we collected direct observational 
data (audio and video tapes of the instructional activities) written documents (students’ responses 
at the pretest and posttest), interview data collected after each session, and the students’ concept 
maps at the beginning  (week 2) and at the end (week 6) of the intervention. These data were 
subsequently used to construct three measures, a measure of the students’ Explanatory 
Frameworks (Ontological Beliefs), a measure of the students’ Conceptual Understanding of 
Complex Systems, and a measure of the Development of Students’ Systems Thinking. Table 2 
describes how the research questions are related to these instruments and to the data analysis. 
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Table 2.      Data Analysis Matrix 
Table 2. Main Questions: 
1. Do students explanatory frameworks of scientific phenomena (ontological beliefs) change as a consequence of an instructional intervention utilizing simulations of complex systems and 
cognitive scaffolding? 
2. What Complex Systems concepts do students acquire during the instructional activities? What appears to facilitate or restrict the acquisition of these concepts? 
3. What is the development of students’ systems thinking? 
 
Sub-Component of Questions 
 
Data 
 
 
How will these data be analyzed? 
 
What can be said about data analysis?  
1.1.a What mental models do students 
construct of the phenomena under 
study? Do these mental models 
change during the course of study?  
 
1.1.b Are there stages or dimensions to 
mental model development 
(Vosniadou)? 
If mental models mediate what we 
choose to observe and, in turn, shape 
our explanatory capabilities 
(Vosniadou, 1994), then we may look 
at changes in observations and 
explanatory capabilities as a way to 
infer what mental model exist. 
Longitudinal approach  
• transcripts  
• concept maps 
 
Comparative approach 
• pretest - posttest answers 
• posttest – expert answers 
• session 6 – expert concept 
maps 
 
Posttest only approach 
• evolution question 
 
Evidence of their ability to observe/identify and 
use the newly introduced concepts. 
 
Evidence that their explanations using these new 
concepts. 
 
 
As the learner’s ability to observe new 
dimensions of the concept(s) increases, the 
relationships between the concepts change 
and therefore their explanations change. 
 
 
1.1.1 What is “observed” by the 
student? i.e., what concepts/terms are 
identified during which simulation. 
 
 
1.1.2 Do students recognize the same 
concepts across different 
simulations/situations or different 
things from different simulations? This 
answer will respond to diSessa & 
Sherin’s notion of invariance and 
integration. 
Longitudinal approach 
Transcripts from sessions using 
simulations: 
Session 1 (Slime) 
Session 2 (GasLab) 
 
Session 3 (Tutorial) 
Session 5 (Wolf-Sheep) 
 
(within case and cross-case 
comparisons required) 
 
1.1.1 Frequency counts - descriptive 
- using grid of complex dynamic systems’ 
concepts (emergent causal) as identified by 
Jacobson 2000; Holland 1992; Chi 1999. 
 
 
1.1.2.a Judged by the way that they are used, 
which concepts appear to be more deeply 
understood? By which students? 
 
1.1.2.b What’s observed from these concepts and 
how does it change over time: 
• surface features 
1.1.1 Statement of which concepts are 
identified and which are not.  
 
 
 
 
1.1.2.a Conclusion drawn about the 
efficacy of certain simulations in 
developing certain concepts. 
 
1.1.2.b Conclusion about the level of 
understanding of the concept based on the 
number of times used or ways they are 
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Table 2. Main Questions: 
1. Do students explanatory frameworks of scientific phenomena (ontological beliefs) change as a consequence of an instructional intervention utilizing simulations of complex systems and 
cognitive scaffolding? 
2. What Complex Systems concepts do students acquire during the instructional activities? What appears to facilitate or restrict the acquisition of these concepts? 
3. What is the development of students’ systems thinking? 
 
Sub-Component of Questions 
 
Data 
 
 
How will these data be analyzed? 
 
What can be said about data analysis?  
 
 
1.1.3 Are there differences between the 
students’ level of understanding? How 
is this explained? 
• structural features 
 
1.1.3.a  Based on the transcripts, who understood 
which concepts?  
 
1.1.3.b Based on the concept maps who organized 
concepts more like an expert? Who did not? 
 
1.1.3.c Based on the posttest answers, who used 
more emergent framework explanations? Who 
did not? 
 
used. 
 
1.1.3.a Statement of what types of student 
characteristics may explain the different 
types of results. 
 
1.1.3.b Statement of what types of 
understanding may be required to facilitate 
the learner’s change in explanatory 
frameworks (i.e., acceptance of a new 
ontological perspective). 
 
 
 
1.2 How are the concepts organized?  
 
 
 
1.2.1Concept maps from 
sessions. Number of concepts 
correctly linked compared to 
experts. 
 
1.2.2 Transcripts coded for one 
“focal” concept at a time and 
see what is observed/discussed 
with its mention. 
 
 
1.2.1 Patterns of recognition 
- are there relational hierarchies, clumps or 
chains?  
 
1.2.2 Comparison to experts concept maps of 
concepts. 
 
 
 
 
1.2.1 Statement of which concepts are 
probably conceptually linked in causal 
network. 
 
1.2.2 Statement that comparing these 
learners to experts organization and 
structuring. 
 
 
1.3 Is there conceptual change? 
Restructuring (conceptual change) 
• adding new information 
• new observations 
Comparative approach 
• pretest – posttest 
• concept maps 
1.3.1 Propositional relationships of concepts: i.e., 
which concepts are related. From a propositional 
analysis of explanations in each session. 
 
1.3.1 More deliberate use of emergent 
concepts. E.g., greater understanding of 
probabilitistic phenomena and the role of 
uncertainty. Greater understanding of the 
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Table 2. Main Questions: 
1. Do students explanatory frameworks of scientific phenomena (ontological beliefs) change as a consequence of an instructional intervention utilizing simulations of complex systems and 
cognitive scaffolding? 
2. What Complex Systems concepts do students acquire during the instructional activities? What appears to facilitate or restrict the acquisition of these concepts? 
3. What is the development of students’ systems thinking? 
 
Sub-Component of Questions 
 
Data 
 
 
How will these data be analyzed? 
 
What can be said about data analysis?  
• new points of reference 1.3.2 Rate the quality of the conceptual network 
being developed (high, medium, low). 
 
1.3.3 Pre/post test comparisons of concept use. 
role of interaction among agents in 
determining organizational patterns of 
behavior. 
Emerging Hypothesis A.1: Learners who are able to identify the same concept/terms from different simulations will be more likely to have understood and integrated that 
concept into their causal network. 
(based on diSessa & Sherin’s integration and invariance). 
Emerging Hypothesis A.2: instruction using StarLogo and cognitive coaching will facilitate the development of new schema of emergent heuristics. This in turn will 
facilitate conceptual change in this knowledge domain. 
1.4 What is retained after a period of no 
instruction? What changes occur after 8 
months? 
 
 Comparative approach. 
• transcripts 5 compared to 6 
• concept maps changes 
between session 5 and 6 
1.4.1 Recall of concepts and terms. Judgment 
based on: 
• use of concepts in explanations and general 
answers.  
• definitions provided. 
• answers to direct questions of recall. 
 
1.4.2 Consistency of terms used in the specific 
context. Comparison with prior use. 
1.4.3Development of concepts within the concept 
maps. 
 
 
Emerging Hypothesis B: the level of understanding will have increased due to the embedding of these concepts into other disciplines. Therefore, it becomes more integrated 
into declarative knowledge networks and becomes Context Independent knowledge (Barsalou, 1987). 
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3.2.1 Explanatory Framework (Ontological Beliefs) Taxonomies 
After the students listened to an introductory lecture on complex systems they were asked 
to give a written response to a problem involving a complex system (the pretest). The students’ 
written responses were coded as described below and used to determine the changes in their 
explanatory frameworks of scientific phenomena (ontological beliefs). Approximately 5 weeks 
after the pretest, the students were given a second, similar problem involving complex systems 
(the posttest). The problems are described in Appendix A. 
An ontologically-based coding rubric with a reasonably high reliability (α = 0.81) was 
developed based on Chi, Slotta & deLeeuw (1994) and Jacobson (2000). It was used to code the 
students’ responses on the pretest and posttest. The specific taxonomies used to code the 
clockwork mental models (CWMMs) and emergent framework mental models (EFMMs) are 
presented in Tables 3 and 4. 
 
Table 3.     Specific taxonomy used to code Clockwork Mental Models (CWMMs). 
Clockwork Mental Model (CWMM) Components of coding 
Ontological perspective – Reductive 1) Agents’ act in isolation. 
2) Simple stepwise description. 
Control of system – Centralized • Orders/controls come from outside. Or is within the 
system but not attributed to the individual agents within. 
(e.g., different agents have different rules;  mention of 
hierarchy). 
Action effects – Linear • One thing leads to another. E.g. direct link between 
controller and controllee. (e.g., action→reaction) 
Agents’ actions – Deterministic (i.e., Predictable) 
 
• Agents’ actions are predictable. 
e.g., they (it) will perform the action. There is no mention 
of randomness or chance in their actions. 
Underlying causes – Teleologic • It knows the end point: e.g., it knows it has to survive. 
Systems’ Nature – Static • Explicit descriptions of non-changing system. 
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Table 4.     Specific taxonomy used to code Emergent Framework Mental Models. 
Emergent Framework Mental 
Models (EFMM) 
Components of coding 
Ontological perspective – Emergent Self-
organization ontology 
 
Question: 1.Does a pattern emerging? 2. 
Is there a difference between agents and 
system? 3. What draws the system 
together? 
1) Local interactions among agents, 
2) leads to the creation of something that exhibits a 
differential behavior than those of the component agents; 
3) this interaction is made possible due to some type of 
identification (tagging device /organizing agent), 
4) and, communication (flows of information and/or 
resources). 
Control of system -Decentralized control 
Question: Who or what initiates the 
formation of the system? 
1) The individual agents are independent of each other, yet 
they all operate under the same rules; 
 
Action effects – Nonlinear effects 
Question: Are there feedback loops 
within the system? Do they amplify or 
control the outcome? 
1) Positive feedback is a feature of these systems therefore 
small actions can exhibit exponential results. 
Agents’ actions – Random action 
(indeterminacy)  
Question: How do the agents behave 
before they are part of the system? 
1) Agents appear to act in random independent fashion, 
Also possibly present in the answer: 
2) Randomness allows for variability and variety within the 
system. 
Underlying causes – Probabilistic causes  
(Stochastic) 
 
Question: Is the same outcome 
guaranteed each time the system forms? 
1) The system organizes itself based on the interactions of the 
agents as described above, therefore the resulting structure is 
never certain, rather it is stochastic which implies that there is 
a probability based emergent pattern.  
Also possibly present in the answer: 
2) Like other probabilistic processes, larger numbers over 
longer time periods are more likely to result in the formation 
of normal distributions. 
Systems’ Nature – Dynamic homeostatic 
nature 
Question: Is there movement of the 
agents within the system? 
Agents may move through, and in and out, of the system, 
however the system persists in a self-organizing fashion. 
1) Once the system, the recurring structure, emerges it 
exhibits a more stable quality; yet all the component agents 
have the potential to be replaced by other similar 
independently operating agents. 
 
 
 
 
The raters first read the entire response made by each student and parsed it using the 
following procedure adapted from Mosenthal and Kintsch (1992a, 1992b): identify the verb 
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(action), the noun (agent), and the object (agent effect). Using the mental model taxonomy, the 
raters next coded each parsed statement into one of three possible categories (EFMM, CWMM, 
or NM) according to how it answered the following five questions: (1) who or what is controlling 
the system – “Control of System”; (2) how do the agents’ behave at the start of the process – 
“Action Effect”; (3) what are the effects of the agent’s actions – “Agents’ Actions”; (4) what is 
the underlying cause of the system’s behavior – “Underlying Cause”; and (5) how does the 
system behave – “Systems’ Nature”? (see Tables 3 and 4).  
The raters coded the student’s responses into the sixth category, “Ontological 
Perspective”, somewhat differently. Because of the more global nature of this category, it was 
the only one to be coded at a large grain level. That is, raters coded the entire response rather 
than not each parsed statement. The strategy for scoring this category relied on the answers to the 
following four questions: Was there mention of (a) local interactions between agents, (b) 
identification of some mechanism that would draw the agents together (tags), (c) recognition of a 
flow of information or resources which creates the system out of independent agents (flows), 
and, (d) identification of some type of pattern formation as the agents come together to form a 
system? If there were answers to any of these four questions the appropriate letter was entered. 
If, however, the student’s response did not address these questions, but instead there was 
evidence of a stepwise (reductive) approach to the explanation, coupled with descriptions of the 
agents as isolated entities (i.e., no interaction among agents) the answer was coded as CWMM. 
As before, if neither mental mode applied then the NM column was coded.  
From the initial testing of the coding scales it was determined that it was easier to code 
each question twice: once to identify evidence of one mental model (e.g., CWMM), then again to 
identify evidence of the other mental model (e.g., EFMM). This method produced greater 
consistency from the raters. To clarify by way of example, rater #1 started coding all pretest 
responses for evidence of emergent framework mental models (EFMM). He would then repeat 
the process a second time, coding all pretest answers for evidence of clockwork mental models 
(CWMM). Rater #2 would by contrast, start coding all pretest responses for evidence of 
CWMMs, then repeating the process, code for evidence of EFMMs. This method addressed 
possible threats of an “order effect” from the coding procedure.  
All the data derived from the ontologically-based mental model coding were scored 
according to a binary method (1 or 0) thereby indicating evidence (1) or no evidence (0) of a 
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particular mental model. Although this binary method causes a loss of sensitivity11 due to the 
inability to distinguish the relative frequency of idea units  (Slotta et al., 1995), its use was 
justified because of the increase in clarity when it came to identifying the learner’s likely mental 
model (i.e., EFMM, CWMM, or NM).  
The question of reliability was addressed by having three raters (rater #1 = a biology 
graduate student, the primary rater for the final coding, rater #2 = the biology subject mater 
expert, and rater #3 = the first author). All raters coded the posttest responses, however, only 
raters #1 and #3 coded the pretest responses.  
The training of the raters took approximately 60 minutes and they were provided with a 
coding key (see Appendix B). The inter-rater reliability was established by comparing the 
individual coding of two raters. The number of total responses was multiplied by the number of 
categories to be coded, then by the number of possible mental model stated (EFMM, CWMM, 
NM). Differences between raters were counted as the raw number of cells that were different. 
Therefore, if one coded a category as EFMM while the other coded the same category as 
CWMM this was counted as two changes.  
On the pretest scores there was agreement on 418 out of 450 scores yielding an inter-rater 
reliability coefficient of 0.93. On the posttest scores there was agreement on 140 out of 162 
scores, yielding an inter-rater reliability of 0.86. Inconsistencies were resolved through 
discussion between raters until consensus was reached. 
 
3.2.2 Conceptual Understanding of Complex Systems 
A coding schema was also developed to determine students’ conceptual understanding of 
the various aspects of complex systems  (i.e., the Complex Systems Taxonomy referred to as the 
CST). It was adapted from Jacobson (2000) and from the study of complexity (i.e., complex 
systems) and reflects concepts presented by Holland (1995, 1998), Bar-Yam (1997), Kauffman, 
(1995), and others. It was intended to provide a "Fine Grain" description of the behaviors that 
emergent phenomena exhibit; therefore, most of the overlapping of concepts was removed. The 
CST was used to code the transcripts because it provided the broadest list of categories that could 
be identified from these data. It was used to examine the student’s focus of attention on aspects 
of complex systems and as such, tells us more about how their understanding of complex 
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11 Slotta, et al. (1995) in reference to the loss of sensitivity state: “this measure, although still yielding the same basic results, 
robbed the analysis of any sensitivity to differences between or patterns within the use of different predicates” (p. 386). 
systems may have occurred. In essence, it sheds light on: (1) which concepts may be easily 
understood, in the process helping to explain the results of this as well as other similar studies; 
(2) which concepts may be strongly entrenched in component beliefs; and (3) which may not be 
well represented by the intervention. The complete CST is presented in Table 5. Further 
elaboration on the process of how the coding schemas were developed appears in Appendix C. 
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Table 5.     Complex Systems Taxonomy (CST). 
 
COMPLEX SYSTEM 
CODING 
TAXONOMY 
DEFINITIONS 
1. Local interactions. Local interaction of many individual agents result in the formation of higher level entity. 
2. Simple rules produce 
complex results. 
Simple rules produce complex results through a complex interplay of local interactions.  
3. Decentralized control  Emergent systems exhibit organization without centralized control. (i.e., decentralized control). 
Agents are independent and competition among themselves. 
4. Random behavior Behavior of the individual agent is uncertain because of the innumerable possible local interactions.
5. Tags  Tags are an organizing mechanism that allows the agents to select among agents or objects that  
would otherwise be indistinguishable. They are filtering, specialization, and cooperation devices. 
Tags are the mechanism behind hierarchical organization-the agent/meta-agent/meta-meta-
agent/...organization.  
6. Flows  Flows of information/resources throughout the system using networks involving: node → connectors 
→ resources. 
Flows through networks vary over time. Moreover, nodes and connections can appear and disappear 
as the agents adapt or fail to adapt.  
• Feedback (positive or 
negative) 
. 
Feedback is where the influence of an element impacts on other elements through a series of 
relationships that return to the initial point, i.e., feeds back on itself. 
Multiplier effect is the result of (positive feedback). Example of positive feedback (amplification of 
the initial state. Out of control if it goes to far). Helps achieve contained contraction or replication 
and growth or can lead to uncontained and unstable contraction or growth. 
Recycling effect - also defines the constraints.  
7. Internal models  Internal models (schemas) give the agent the power to anticipate - tacit internal models simply 
prescribes a current action/ overt internal models uses lookahead protocols. 
8. Diversity/ variability  Diversity also known as “requisite variety”. A control system must have adequate variety. The 
variety of the control system must be greater than the variety of the controlled system or the 
environment.  
9. Modularity  Hierarchical nature of systems allow for recycling of useful components. 
Building blocks are the components of a complex system that can be used and reused in a great 
variety of combinations like a set of Lego building blocks. These reusable components make it 
possible to make sense of novel situations. Subassemblies are building blocks of the emergent 
complex system. 
10. Pattern formation Pattern formation: Prominent among simple mathematical models that capture pattern formation are 
local activation / long range inhibition models. 
11. Open/closed systems Generally emergent systems are open systems but can be closed (e.g. gas pressure). 
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 COMPLEX SYSTEM 
CODING 
TAXONOMY 
DEFINITIONS 
12. Multiple Levels Systems are nested. Therefore complex systems are made up of many subcomponents that may 
themselves be nested systems.  
13. Probabilistic Probabilistic behaviors have non-deterministic outcomes. Population size affects the results. The 
larger the sample size the more reliable the prediction of outcome and the more the outcome reflects 
a “normal distribution” curve. The smaller the sample, the more likely that individual differences 
will make it difficult to predict the outcome.  
14. Nonlinearity  Nonlinear systems are more complex than linear systems. A feature of nonlinear systems is that 
different starting points lead to different end points and can cause the model to become unstable. 
Behavior is often counterintuitive. 
15. Criticality  Lever points wherein small amounts of input produce large directed change; threshold effect (e.g., 
phase changes). 
16. Dynamic 
equilibrium  
Homeostasis /Dynamic equilibrium with fluxes in and out.  
The notion that organisms (systems) exchange information, materials and/or energy with their 
environment in order to survive therefore over time the materials that make up the organism (system) 
has partially or totally changed. 
Multiple (meta) stable states. Small displacements (perturbations) lead to recovery, larger ones can 
lead to radical changes of properties. Dynamics on such a landscape do not average simply. 
Mathematical models are generally based upon local frustration e.g.. spin glasses, random Boolean 
nets. Attractor networks use local minima as memories. Examples: weather - persistent structures, 
proteins - results of displacements in sequence or physical space, physiology - the effect of shocks, 
dynamics of e.g. the heart, brain/mind - memory, recovery from damage, economy/society - e.g. 
suggested by dynamics of market responses. 
17. Adaptation  Adaptation is defined as agent and environment interactions. An example is “fitness landscape”. 
"Fitness landscape": Part of a Hill-climbing algorithm in which the search space turns into a fitness 
landscape, where every point in the space (“horizontal”) is associated with a “vertical” fitness value, 
so that a landscape with valleys and peaks appears. Problem-solving then reduces to “hill-climbing”: 
following the path through the fitness landscape that leads most directly upward. 
18. Selection Selection suitability of the particular trait an agent has for surviving long enough to reproduce in a 
particular environment. 
It is also defined as information (a la Shannon’s theory). Selection as information is relevant to the 
issue of multiple selection: replication (reproduction) with variation, and comparative selection 
(competition) as a mechanism for POSSIBLE increase in complexity. Consistent with modern 
biological views of evolution it is essential to emphasize that selection does not have to increase 
complexity. 
19. Time scale. Time scale is a critical feature in development of complex systems. 
20. Multiple causality Emergent systems are dependent on multiple actions and interactions to create their complexity. 
Therefore the number of agents in an environment with multiple components to interact with will 
create infinite possibilities of outcome. 
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3.2.3 Conceptual Development of Students’ Systems’ Thinking (Concept Maps) 
 
Adhering to the three criteria – a task, a response format, and a scoring system – 
described by Ruiz-Primo and Shavelson (1996) helped to document the concept mapping process 
and thereby created an audit trail for this event.  
 
The task. Ruiz-Primo and Shavelson, (1996) tell us that the “task” is defined in three 
parts, (1) what the learner is required to accomplish, (2) the constraints of the performance, and 
(3) the “task content structures”. The latter is described as “the intersection of the task demands 
and the constraints with the structure of the subject domain to be mapped” (p.578). In this study 
students’ task demands were straightforward: construct a concept map reflecting their 
understanding of complex systems’ behaviors. The task constraints included using the terms 
provided, however, it was not limited to those terms only. The students were allowed to arrange 
the terms in any manner that best reflected their changing understanding. Lastly, no constraints 
were placed on the structure of the maps therefore the final organizational structures were 
evaluated as evidence of students’ conceptual understanding.  
 
Response format. In this study the student was presented with the 12 terms related to 
complex systems’ behaviors on “post-it” notes and asked to arrange them on a board in such a 
way as to express their understanding of how the terms may be related. Maps from the first 
mapping session (session 2) therefore appeared a little clumsy because of this technique, even 
though students were given the opportunity to draw links or add comments. After the initial 
activity, the interviewer transcribed the maps into pencil and paper representations. All 
subsequent mapping activities were made in this dual mode with the student provided first with 
the paper version of their map, and if they required more freedom to move nodes around, they 
were allowed to use the post-it notes on a board. These two modes of response formats were 
viewed as supporting each other, therefore, they should not account for any variation or change 
in the concept maps produced between students or sessions. 
 
Criteria Used to Score Concept Maps  
Informed by the literature (Ruiz-Primo & Shavelson, 1996; Jonassen, Reeves, Hong, 
Harvey, & Peters, 1997), we selected two criteria to evaluate the students’ concept maps: (1) 
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concept pairings (McClure & Bell, 1990), and (2) organizational structure (DeSimone & Schmid, 
in press).  
 
Criterion 1. The importance of the concept-parings (i.e., node-link-node relationships) 
was established using criterion maps (experts’ maps). The literature tells us that comparisons to 
experts are always controversial because there is substantial evidence that experts’ knowledge 
representations vary dramatically one from another. However, we attempted to address this 
limitation by using an averaging technique (e.g., average of experts, average of high achieving 
students, etc.) as described by Acton, Johnson and Goldsmith (1994). Their findings suggest that 
average ratings of experts improved the comparisons. Because of our access to a limited number 
of experts we used a standard textbook definition of complex systems as a starting reference 
point. 
 
Establishing the weighting of the links based on the text definition. Among the twelve 
concepts, three were lexical concept: “complex system”, “simple system” and “system”. Of the 
possible pairings it was anticipated that  “complex systems” lexical concept would form a central 
node and be closely linked with the following concepts: decentralized, dynamic, random, self-
organizing and probabilistic (represented as “yellow” rectangular nodes in the concept maps); 
whereas, “simple systems” would not be directly linked to these terms (represented as “blue” 
rectangular nodes in the concept maps). Therefore the former relationships were assigned a score 
of 1 point for each direct link. The remaining concepts, centralized, algorithmic, static, 
predictable, (represented as “white” rectangular nodes in the concept maps) could be linked to 
either “simple systems” directly, or to “complex systems” but in an indirect fashion; that is, 
qualified by direction of links and/or propositional statement between nodes. No score therefore 
were assigned to these and less predictable paired relationships. 
 
Establishing the weighting of the links based on criterion maps. Based on the maps 
collected from four experts, we determined the weightings to assign for the links between nodes. 
Starting with the map (Figure 1) we established that many concepts were indirectly linked to the 
central node “complex systems”. Furthermore, in addition to that node, the term “self-
organization” also formed a central node on other experts’ concept maps (see another example 
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Figure 2). Three of the four experts generated maps supporting these linked pairs. Hence, these 
consistently paired relationships were assigned a weighting of 3 points. They are as follows: 
 
self-organizing paired with  probabilistic / random = 3 pts 
self-organizing ″ dynamic = 3 pts 
probabilistic ″ random = 3 pts 
 
 
Two levels of pairings were thus assigned. The former as described by the textbook 
definition of complex systems, and the latter based on these averaged criterion-map paired 
relationships. If these terms were linked to a paired concept in more than one fashion, each link 
was scored as a separate pairing. 
 
Criterion 2. As a second criterion to examining and scoring the students’ concept maps 
we drew upon DeSimone and Schmid’s technique for analyzing the deep structure and quality of 
concept maps (see DeSimone & Schmid, in press). However, because concept mapping in this 
study was used primarily for eliciting verbal protocols (i.e., more elaborated conceptual 
reasoning thereby richer transcript data), as opposed to being used as a main assessment activity, 
we chose to adopt a simplified version of their analysis and scoring technique. Instead of 
examining the maps at the many possible levels of labeled relationships structures, we applied 
the scoring only to the organizational appearance of the map. Hence, hierarchical maps were 
assigned 3 points, cluster formations were assigned 2 points, and chain formations assigned 1 
point. In the event of maps that were somewhere between a cluster formation and a hierarchical 
formation, we assigned a score of 2 points. Only obvious vertical relationships with evidence of 
subsuming levels of organization were assigned as hierarchical maps. 
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Figure 1.  Expert’s concept map of complex systems concepts. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.     Advance-learner concept maps of complex systems concepts. 
 
 56
RESULTS 
 
 
We addressed the following three questions in the research described in this paper:  
 
1) Do students explanatory frameworks of scientific phenomena (ontological beliefs) change as 
a consequence of an instructional intervention utilizing simulations of complex systems (i.e., 
StarLogo) and supported by cognitive scaffolding? 
2) What conceptual understanding of complex systems do they acquire during the instructional 
activities? 
3) What is the development in students’ systems thinking as evidenced by their concept maps?  
 
 
4.1 Question 1: Changes in Explanatory Frameworks 
 
Table 6 and Figure 3 show that there was an increase in students’ responses indicating 
emergent framework mental models (EFMMs), but, little or no change in students’ responses 
indicating clockwork mental models (CWMMs). At the same time there was a significant 
decrease in the number of responses that could not be coded as either mental model. 
 
Thus, ontological training supported the acquisition and use of emergent framework 
mental models (EFMMs). In fact, all nine students gained some level of awareness of emergent 
causal processes and all demonstrated some level of transfer ability in solving emergent 
analogous problems. Clockwork mental models (CWMMs) do not change substantially as a 
result of emergent ontology instruction, and possibly emergent frameworks mental models 
indeed do not replace clockwork mental models. Students with no mental models of emergent 
processes may benefit more from ontology training than students with clockwork mental models.
 57
Table 6.     Gains in students’ mental models (n = 9). 
Pretest Posttest Scores on 
M SD M SD 
Emergent Framework 
Mental Models (EFMMs) 5.6 5.6 12.7* 5.8 
Clockwork Mental Model 
(CWMMs) 
3.4 3 3 2.8 
No Model (NM) 10.7 3.1 5.9* 3.2 
* Significance at α 0.01 on one-tailed independent samples t test. 
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Figure 3.  Changes in Explanatory Frameworks or Ontological Beliefs   
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Table 7 shows a categorization of the changes in each student’s mental model and 
indicates that most students showed evidence of synthetic mental models. This supports 
Vosniadou et al.’s (2001) contention that this may be a necessary part of the conceptual change 
process. 
 
 
Table 7.   Meaning of changes to mental model categories. 
Mental Model 
Em
ergent 
Fram
e-
w
ork 
(EFM
M
)
C
lockw
ork 
(C
W
M
M
) 
N
o M
odel 
coded 
(N
M
) 
Status Label Students 
+ – – 
Desired state. Learning of 
EFMM occurs. It is stable 
and coherent (i.e., 
integrated into 
understanding). 
Emergent 
Mental Model 
Group 
Greg 
+ +/– – 
With gains in both mental 
models, they are unstable, 
but the learner is aware of 
their explanations 
therefore more coherent. 
Synthetic 1A 
Mental Model  
(increasing 
coherence)  
Mitch 
Sam 
Sidney 
+ – +/– 
With losses in CWMMs 
the learner is moving 
towards a more stable 
mental model but with 
gains in NMs it means 
that they are unsure and 
therefore lack coherent 
understanding. Therefore 
they cannot bring their 
ideas together to generate 
coherent explanations. 
Synthetic 2A  
Mental Model  
(increasing 
stability)  
Walter 
+/– – +/– 
With gains and losses in 
EFMMs, and gains in 
NMs it suggest that the 
mental models are 
unstable and incoherent 
Novice 
Emergent 
Mental Model  
Emilie 
Norman 
Penny 
Monique 
(increase = +, decrease =  –  ) 
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4.2 Question 2: Conceptual Understanding of Complex Systems 
 
 
The results in Table 8 represent the scores for 13 out of the possible 20 categories of the 
complex systems taxonomy (CST) for all nine students over the course of three instructional 
sessions that employed simulations. From this we can make the following two generalizations: 
 
 
• When we collapse across students, and focus on the total scores for each session, we can 
see that the specific simulation used influenced which complex systems concepts were 
discussed by the students. We call this dimension the affordance of the simulation. Thus, 
differences among the simulations influence the effectiveness of the intervention. 
• When we collapse across simulations, and focus on the combined relative scores, we can 
see that although all the students discussed, and possibly learned, some of the complex 
systems concepts, there was variation in both the nature and number of complex systems 
concepts discussed by the students. Thus, individual differences among students 
influence the effectiveness of the intervention. 
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Table 8.     Complex systems concepts identified by student and reported by session. 
Complex System Concept 
Simulation  Student 
ML LI OS PR RB FL TA DE SR DC DI NL PA 
Combin
ed 
Scores
Norman 8.4 4.6  2.3 2.1 1.3 0.4  0.1     19.1
Penny 9.1 2.2 0.7 2.2 0.7 1.1   0.1 1.5   0.4 17.9
Emilie 12 2.4 0.3 0.1  0.4  0.1      15.4
Monique 6.7 2  0.3  0.4 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1    10.1
Walter 9.6 4.4 0.5 2.3 0.3 1.1  0.3  0.2    18.9
Mitch 12.5 6.6 1.1 3.2 0.6 1.5  0.2      25.7
Sidney 12.2 6.3 0.3 4.1 2.5 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3   26.8
Greg 11.4 7.8 1.3 5.2 1.6 1.3 1 0.3 0.4  0.3  0.7 30.9
Sam 11.5 6.4 1.1 2.1 1.9 0.5   0.4 0.5   1.6 25.6
Slime  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total scores  93.4 42.7 5.3 21.8 9.7 8 2 1.3 1.4 2.5 0.6 0 2.7 190.4
Norman 3.7 2.7 0.7 1.5 0.7     0.2    9.5
Penny 4.4 2.1 0.6 1.7 0.1   0.2  0.1  0.1  9.3
Emilie 4.1 1.4 0.3 0.9 0.2         6.9
Monique  1.0  2.0    0.2      3.1
Walter 4.8 2.3 1.4 2.0    0.1    0.1  10.6
Mitch 5.8 5.6 3.7 3.0 1.3  0.2 0.2  0.2  0.2  20.2
Sidney 4.3 3.2 1.4 4.3 0.4   0.2  0.1   0.1 14
Greg 8.4 7.9 6.8 5.1 0.2  0.2 0.2    0.2 0.2 29.2
Sam 5.6 3.1 1.5 2.0 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.3  0.2    14
GasLab  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total scores  41.1 29.3 16.4 22.5 3.5 0.3 0.5 1.4 0 0.8 0 0.6 0.3 116.8
Norman 4.0 8.0 2.0 2.0 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.1    0.1 0.5 17.8
Penny 2.2 2.3 0.8 1.3 0.1  0.2  0.1 0.3    7.5
Emilie 4.9 4.7 1.6 1.6 0.3  0.1   0.6    13.8
Monique N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Walter 6.5 6.3 2.2 2.4 0.7  0.7 0.2  0.1  0.1 0.8 20.2
Mitch 7.7 8.4 0.6 5.4 0.8  1 0.2  0.1   0.1 24.4
Sidney 14.3 7.6 0.7 2.4 0.8  0.5 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1  27.1
Greg 6.0 10 4.0 2.7 0.6  0.8 0.5  0.3 0.1 0.3  25.7
Sam 5.2 8.0 1.5 3.2   0.8   0.6 0.4  0.2 20
Wolf- 
Sheep  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total scores  50.8 55.3 13.4 21 3.6 0.3 4.6 1.1 0.2 2.2 0.6 0.6 1.6  
Grand totals  185.3 127.3 35.1 65.3 16.8 8.6 7.1 3.8 1.6 5.5 1.2 1.2 4.6 307.2
 
ML is Multiple Levels of Organization, LI is Local Interactions, OS is Open Systems, PR is Probabilistic Behavior, 
RB is Random Behavior, TA is Tags, FL is Flows, DE is Dynamic Equilibrium, SR is Simple Rules, DC is 
Decentralized Control, DI is Diversity, NL is Nonlinear, PA is Pattern Recognition 
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Affordances of three simulations.  One of the major themes constructed from the 
categories to emerge from the interviews was that the different simulations facilitated the 
acquisition of different aspects of complex systems. That is, the simulations differed in their 
affordances for learning emergent causal processes.  
The results in Table 9 represent the total responses aggregated across students. It displays 
the percentage of responses within each complex systems component.  
 
 
Table 9.   Distribution of Responses within Complex Systems Taxonomy (CST) for each  
 simulation. 
Percentage of responses within each Complex Systems Concept Simulations
ML LI OS PR RB TA FL DE SR DC DI NL PA 
Slime  49.1 22.4   2. 8 11.4 5.1 4.20 1.10 0.68 0.74 1.30 0.32 0.00 1.40
FreeGas  35.2 25.1  14.0 19.3 3.0 0.26 0.43 1.20 0.00 0.68 0.00 0.51 0.26
Wolf-Sheep 32.5 35.3    8.6 13.4 2.3 0.19 2.90 0.70 0.13 1.40 0.38 0.38 1.00
  
ML is Multiple Levels of Organization, LI is Local Interactions, OS is Open Systems, PR is Probabilistic Behavior, 
RB is Random Behavior, TA is Tags, FL is Flows, DE is Dynamic Equilibrium, SR is Simple Rules, DC is 
Decentralized Control, DI is Diversity, NL is Nonlinear, PA is Pattern Recognition 
 
 
       We constructed the following 4 point scale to describe the affordances based on the experts’ 
ratings, the literature, and the assumption that all the simulations should have offered equal 
affordances for learning the six major aspects of complex systems described by Jacobson (2000). 
• High affordance = above 34%  
• High Moderate = 33% - 17%  
• Low Moderate = 16% - 8%  
• Low = 7% - 3% 
  
Table 9 indicates that all three simulations provided affordances of at least high moderate 
for two complex systems concepts: “multiple levels of organization and “local interaction”. They 
provided a low moderate affordance for the complex system concept “probabilistic nature” and a 
low affordance for the complex systems concept of  “random behavior”. The other categories in 
the coding taxonomy produced fewer than 3% of the total observations and therefore were 
considered to indicate a weak affordance for learning. 
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All the simulations provided opportunities to observe and discuss “multiple levels of 
organization”, “local interactions” and “probabilistic nature” albeit to different extents. Only the 
Slime simulation provided opportunities to observe and discuss “tags” but it did not provide 
opportunities to observe and discuss “open systems”; the Wolf-Sheep simulation did not provide 
opportunities to observe and discuss “random behavior”. All the simulations had only weak 
affordances (< 3%) for all the other complex systems concepts.  However, despite the similarities 
in the affordances of the simulations, students did not acquire the complex systems concepts 
equally well from all simulations as will be discussed shortly. 
 
4.2.1 Individual Difference among Students  
 
Figure 4 illustrates the combined scores on the CST for each student across all sessions. On 
this basis students could be classified into four groups:   
• Sophisticated Emergent Causal Processes (ECP) Identifier (CST score > 75). This 
describes Greg who is considered an outlier at the high end. 
• High Moderate Emergent Causal Processes (ECP) Identifier (CST score between 60 and 
70). This describes Mitch, Sidney and Sam. 
• Moderate Emergent Causal Processes (ECP) Identifier (CST score between 40 and 50). 
This describes Walter and Norman. 
• Novice Emergent Causal Processes (ECP) Identifier (CST score between 30 and 40). 
This describes Emilie, Penny, and Monique (an outlier at the low end).  
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Figure 4.   Student’s understanding of Complex Systems concepts over three simulations 
 
The results of Table 10 show the number of statements (relative to each student’s total 
number of statements) that were coded (using the CST) into each Complex Systems concept. 
Thus, it allows us to make a provisional decision on whether each student observed and therefore 
discussed the Complex Systems concepts. If one arbitrarily, takes a value of 1 as the cutoff point, 
we can provisionally conclude that all students including the three Novice ECP Identifiers ( 
Monique, Emilie, and Penny)  observed and discussed the concepts of  “multiple levels of 
organization”, “local interactions”, and “probabilistic causes”. All the other students also 
observed and discussed the concept of “random behavior”. The major difference between the 
Moderate ECP Identifiers (Norman and Walter) and the High ECP Identifiers (Sam, Sidney, and 
Mitch) was in the general strength of their responses. On the other hand, the Sophisticated ECP 
Identifier (Greg) not only had a greater response to the latter concepts, he also observed and 
discussed more concepts, namely “flows” and “dynamic equilibrium”. 
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 Table 10.  Relative number of statements made by each student coded into Complex Systems 
concepts over the three simulations. 
      
 Novice ECP Moderate ECP High-Moderate ECP Sophistic. 
Concept Monique Emelie Penny Norman Walter Sam Sidney Mitch Greg 
 
ML 6.7 21.0 15.7 16.1 20.9 22.3 30.8 26.0 25.8 
LI 3.0 8.5 8.8 11.3 13.0 17.5 17.1 20.6 25.7 
OS 0.0 2.2 3.6 2.7 4.1 4.1 2.4 5.4 12.1 
PR 2.6 2.3 3.6  5.8 6.7 7.3 10.8 11.6 13.0 
RB 0.0 0.5 0.9 3.1 1.0 2.5 3.7 2.7 2.4 
TA 0.4 0.4 1.1 1.6 1.1 0.8 0.4 1.5 1.3 
FL 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.2 1.2 
DE 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.6 1.0 
SR 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.4 
DC 0.1 0.6 1.9 0.2 0.3 1.3 0.5 0.3 0.3 
DI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.4 
NL 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 
PA 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.8 1.8 0.1 0.1 0.9 
 
ML is Multiple Levels of Organization, LI is Local Interactions, OS is Open Systems, PR is Probabilistic Behavior, 
RB is Random Behavior, TA is Tags, FL is Flows, DE is Dynamic Equilibrium, SR is Simple Rules, DC is 
Decentralized Control, DI is Diversity, NL is Nonlinear, PA is Pattern Recognition 
  
Interpreting the results of the low counts for categories that exhibited low moderate 
(random behavior) or weak affordances  (nonlinear effect, decentralized control, dynamic 
equilibrium, etc.), as indicating that students do not observe these concepts may not necessarily 
be the correct conclusion to draw. It may be argued that a low level of observation data does not 
necessarily mean a lack of awareness or understanding of a concept. Indeed, it may indicate that 
the learner readily recognized the behavior described by the concept and chooses to focus instead 
on other concepts that were more challenging or interesting. It may also mean that the simulation 
does not lend itself to observing and therefore discussing the concept. 
A further qualitative investigation of the students’ experiences helps us to understand 
more about what variables are important to the learning of emergent causal processes. In other 
words, it allows us to closely examine which of the variables (e.g., the intervention, the learner, 
the conceptual knowledge) played a greater role in the acquisition of a conceptual understanding 
of the various aspects of Complex Systems. Thus, we will describe the acquisition of the two 
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concepts with at least high moderate affordances  across the three simulations. They are 
“multiple levels of organization”, and “local interactions”.  
 
4.2.2 Acquisition of Concept of Multiple Levels of Organization 
The multiple levels of organization within the system are an important component of the 
aggregation emergence process. A typical observation for this category would be that individual 
agents behaved in one manner while systems (meta-agents) behaved in a different manner. 
Observation of differential behaviors often resulted in terms such as “random” or 
“unpredictable” individual agent actions versus “stable” or “orderly” meta-agent actions. 
Additionally, descriptions could extend to homeostatic behaviors, although that concept was a 
unique node on the complex systems coding taxonomy (CST).  
Therefore what the students appeared to learn was that individual turtles behave 
randomly (Slime simulation) or unpredictably (other simulations) but when they form a meta-
agent or change states, this new level of organization behaves in a more stable and predictable 
fashion. This observation created some constraints in the students’ understanding of where the 
term predictable fit into a concept map related to complex systems. This topic will be expanded 
upon in the discussion. 
It should also be noted that the data analysis for the FreeGas and Wolf-Sheep simulations 
was not as clear-cut as for the Slime simulation. In essence, coding for levels of organization 
required reading several phrases to capture the distinction that the students made between either 
the agent and the meta-agent attribute of net changes (e.g., pressure, total energy within the 
system), as described for FreeGas; or between the individual and population levels as well as the 
level of the system itself, as described in Wolf-Sheep. For instances, key terms or phrases such 
as “population”, “system”, and references to the graphical readout “parabolic curve”, “sine 
wave”, to list a few, were identified as evidence of reference to the macro-level.  
 All three simulations provided opportunities for the students to observe and discuss 
multiple levels of organization as seen in the student interviews presented below. However, there 
was a decrease in the students’ discussion this concept over the three simulations (see Figure 5).  
Of the nine students, eight appeared to have understood this concept. Only Monique 
appeared to have not understood multiple levels of organization. Below are some of the students’ 
statements from each simulation. 
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Greg (Slime Simulation): yeah, you can see that sometimes they leave but the whole system stays constant no matter if they 
leave or join the clusters the system seems to follow the same pattern.                                       273  
 
Emilie (Slime Simulation): The group would be functioning kind of, well, at this, at this point the group would be functioning 
kind of, you know, in a stable way, but the individuals like some of them would not be...would not be...would not...I don't know 
how to put this.  
 647  
Sam (FreeGas): Cause there's only a certain amount of energy in the entire thing. It's just that the individual molecules 
changes... All together [however] they own the same amount of energy throughout.  426                                              
.   
Sidney (Wolf-Sheep Simulation): I don't think it was the simpler one with which we had the altruistic and the selfish ones, 
because in that one it did not have to eat grass, or uh eating something.  And in that case when, where you added more of one, 
the other one didn't counter-balance it, so there's not kind of an equilibrium state.  And what's really odd is the population is 
somehow, the entire population, or like the population of the... sheep and the wolves has reached some kind of constant stability.  
They're going up and down but in a small, a small frame.  And I would call this like uh, a stable state.  Because...  177 
                                                                              
I: Mm-hm.  179 
                                                                              
Sidney: ...because what's happening is at, at one point the sheep are...the sheep population is greater than the wolf population, 
and the next moment it's the reverse.  181 
                                                                              
(pause 5s)                                                                    
                                                                              
Sidney: But this is where I have everything equal, where I have the, the initial sheep and the initial wolves the same.  But I want 
to try let's see now. Now I'm going to make the wolves' population twice the number.     
                                                                              
I: OK, but what do you think is going to happen once you do that?  187 
                                                                              
Sidney: At first I would think perhaps maybe now that the wolves would, would finally overpower the sheep, but somehow I 
don't think so.  189 
                                                                              
(pause 4s)  
 
Sidney: You can see what's happening once again.  They've reached, they're reaching the, these are gonna, like a parabolic curve 
they're taking.  195 
 
Sidney: Well that beats the top one.  And once again they've reached some kind of equilibrium state.  199 
 
Figure 5 indicates that there is a decrease in students’ observation and discussion of 
multiple levels of organization. The Slime simulation may provide more perceptual cues and 
more tightly coupled interactions than the other simulations. Moreover, the Wolf-Sheep 
simulation presented a relatively greater difficulty in observing the abstract meta-agent levels. 
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Figure 5. Changes in the number of statements on multiple levels of organization. 
 
4.2.3 Acquisition of Concept of Local Interactions 
“Local interactions” refers to the behaviors of agents as they operate within the 
environments of the simulations.  In order to be coded at this node, the student had to generate 
evidence of their awareness of individual agents (e.g., slime mould, molecules, sheep, etc.), and 
that these agents’ actions were not isolated from each other but in fact significant changes arose 
because of the different ways in which they could encounter each other or affect each other. In 
short, the student needed to demonstrate that they could reason about both the individual 
behaviors of the agents as well as the impact of potential interactions such as attractions, or 
collisions. In order to code for this category we adopted several key predicate indicators many of 
which appeared to be used regardless of the simulation content: interact, attract, collide, 
aggregate, come together, hit across, form, react to, cluster, move towards, affect, communicate 
with, organize, change each other. There were also another group of predicates used to 
demonstrate local interactions, which suggest telltale signs of “teleological beliefs” that 
constrained the development of the concept “probabilistic causes”: find, look for, build, and join. 
All the students, with the possible exception of Monique, appeared to understand the 
concept of Local Interactions. Some examples of these are provided below: 
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Walter (Slime simulation): well, there are a bunch of turtles moving around randomly and they seem to be giving off these 
green secretions in their wake and it seems as when they get a strong enough secretion they kind of like come together. They 
kind of like attract each other.  5 
 
Penny (FreeGas simulation):: Yeah.  If you look at just look at the molecule itself, it's consistent because, since if, well, if 
they're hitting each other then they're affecting which event takes place.  1049 
 
Mitch (FreeGas simulation):Because, it is a system that...   Whereas, a collision between a fast and a slow particle, it...  They're 
all elastic collisions, so the energy is considered, in one way or the other.  So every elastic collision's going to change the speed 
of each particle in the system, but it's not going to change the speed of the whole system. So, that's why the average speed is 
staying around 8.8 or 8.9...  11 
 
Walter(Wolf-Sheep simulation):: well, the sheep eat the grass. The wolves eat the sheep.  116 
 
Walter: obviously, when there's no sheep there's going to be no more wolves eventually because they're all going to die out. 
Because they're not going to have nothing to eat. 169 
 
Figure 5 and the students’ statements indicate that each simulation provided a different 
opportunity to learn about the concept of local interaction. Awareness and possible learning 
observed from the slime simulation may be attributed to perceptual level display of tightly 
coupled interactions and aggregation of mould into colonies. On the other hand, local 
interactions in the wolf-sheep simulation may have been observed because of the expected causal 
change of events, “sheep eat the grass. The wolves eat the sheep”.  Hence, one explanation for 
the increase in observations may be because students are intuitively familiar with these 
moderately coupled interactions that make up ecological systems.  
            Another explanation, however, may be a consequence of their changing ability to 
observe (i.e., “readout” strategies) different causal processes. In this interpretation of the data, 
the increased number of observations would be described as a consequence of better 
understanding of relationships between agents and not necessarily attributed to the 
representational affordance of the simulations. Alternatively, it may be an interaction of the two. 
Both alternative explanations need to be explored further through other data in this current study 
and perhaps in future studies. 
Figure 6 also indicates that the FreeGas simulation offered weaker affordances of local 
interactions. These results suggest that dissipative complexity models (whose organization is 
most apparent at statistical means) may be less likely to generate observations of local 
interaction, which is congruent with the type of complex system represented by the model. 
Consequently, it should be viewed as one step towards establishing credibility of the findings. In 
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fact, the modest level of local interaction recognition may be explained by the cognitive 
scaffolding that cued students to look for similarities across simulations; therefore, in no way 
attributable to affordances to promote the concept of local interaction generated by this 
simulation. 
Although the FreeGas simulation had weaker affordances for local interactions, Mitch 
and Greg, nonetheless showed high percentage of their time focused on this concept (43% and 
61%, respectively). Both students belong to a cohort of high academic achievers and both had 
above average scores in NYA physics and chemistry: Greg, 97 (intro. chem. 99), Mitch, 84 
(intro. chem. 86). Sidney also achieved a high grade in chemistry (80) but is reported to be aware 
of this for a mere 23% of his observations. However, his grades in physics (70) suggest that there 
may be an interaction between the student’s level of understanding of physics (specifically 
collisions) and the ability to observe local interactions. Further investigation into this possible 
relationship is required.   
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Figure 6. Changes in the number of statements made by individual students on local interactions. 
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4.3 Question 3: Development of Students’ Systems Thinking 
 
 The students’ concept maps were scored and the results are presented in Table 11. 
Examining the scores for session 6 (post intervention) the results show that Greg scored 12 
points (Figure 7) and Mitch scored 11 points (Figure 8) and made a considerable number of 
desirable concept-pairings; followed by Sam with 9 points (Figure 9) and Walter with 9 points 
(Figure 10). By comparison, Sidney scored 7 points (Figure 11) and Norman scored 5 points 
(Figure 12) both displayed a moderate degree of desirable concept-pairings. Finally, Emilie with 
3 points (Figure 13) and Penny with 2 points (Figure 14) both scores are substantially lower than 
the average. Monique’s maps are not shown because she did not complete session 5 and 6, which 
were crucial in the development of the other students’ maps.  
 
Table 11.     Scoring of Concept maps on criteria 1 & 2 over time. 
Quantitative Scoring 
of Concept Maps 
N
orm
a 
Penny 
Em
ilie 
W
alter 
M
itch 
Sidney 
G
reg 
Sam
 
Criteria 1 1 1 0 2 3 4 2 2 
Criteria 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 Session 2 -
initial 
Sub total 2 2 2 4 5 6 4 4 
Criteria 1 3 1 0 7 9 5 9 7 
Criteria 2 2 1 3 2 2 2 3 2 Session 6 
-post 
Sub total 5 2 3 9 11 7 12 9 
Total 7 4 5 13 16 13 16 13 
Change +3 0 +1 +5 +6 +1 +8 +5 
 
In summary, the change over time resulted in large gains for Greg, and moderately large 
gains for Mitch, Sam, and Walter. Whereas, Norman’s results showed moderately small gains, 
Sidney and Emilie showed very small gains. Penny was the only student to show no change 
between assessments.  
Although these quantitative results allow for comparison across cases as well as 
triangulation with other results, additional and rich information was gained from the following 
qualitative inspection of the maps. The concept maps created by the students in session 2 and the 
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final meeting, session 6 are presented on the following pages. These maps almost speak for 
themselves in as much as they show some dramatic changes in understanding of emergent causal 
concepts that are framed within the context of complex systems thinking. As the scores above 
suggest, the maps clustered the students into three groupings: (1) “sophisticated”, (2) 
“moderate”, and (3) “novice”, understandings of complex system relationships. The maps are 
presented in decreasing order of elaboration therefore the first ones with represent the most 
sophisticated understandings.  
This quantitative scoring method established a baseline of difference within cases (time 
series), as well as allowed for between students comparison. Afterwards, the concept maps were 
examined in a qualitative fashion for evidence of qualitative changes both across time, as well as 
cross-case analysis. 
 
4.3.1 Group 1, “Sophisticated” Understanding of Complex Systems  
 
Both Greg (Figure 7) and Mitch (Figure 8) produced hierarchical type maps and 
demonstrated elaborated understanding of the term “complex systems” and its relationship with 
the concept of “self-organization”. In particular, both students appeared to recognize the 
important connection between it as a central node and the many other associated influences; for 
example, random action (Mitch) and probabilistic linked to random behaviors (Greg). A further 
level of understanding was revealed by Greg’s addition of the term “emergence”, also viewed as 
a central node. He independently chose to add this term, and, as we can see, he connected it 
directly to “complex systems” as well as “self-organization”. I contend that, from the perspective 
of this study, this was an important conceptual shift. 
An important consideration. Although not accounted for on the scoring schema, how 
students came to understand this relationship between “emergence” and the other complex 
systems concepts merely through observations and interactions with the StarLogo environments 
was important to this study. The intentional omission of this term therefore provided a means to 
assess the sophistication of the students understanding. (N.B., when the term is present in the 
student’s concept map it is identified as a “dark grey” (or green if in colour) elliptical shaped 
node). 
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Figure 7.     Greg’s concept map - Session 2 & 6 (session 2 upper, session 6 lower). 
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Figure 8.     Mitch’s concept map - Session 2 & 6 (session 2 upper, session 6 lower). 
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Sam’s concept map (Figure 9) was a cluster formation and looked very different from 
those described above. However, his organization of terms revealed a level of sophistication that 
placed him in a unique sub-category of group 1. His identification of concepts was more similar 
to the expert (Figure 1) in that he created a central node out of both “self-organization” as well as 
“dynamic”. Because of these relationships Sam’s clumping of terms into equilibrium-type 
complex systems and dynamic-type complex-systems demonstrated a higher-level view of 
complexity. When asked to explain this organization, Sam was able to be reflective and in fact 
made a small revision to his map based on the conversation below. This is also observable from 
Sam’s score on the CST (Table 10).  
 
 
I: What's happened between then, which is a long time ago and now (laughs) to make you change?  199 
                                                                              
Sam: I think I changed a lot of the way I studied.  So I tried to link things a bit together.  Not like a concept map, but I tried to 
link...  I do try to go from cause to effect, the results a lot, I guess.  So I use just complex system as the basic centre, and I'm 
working off of that.  So I decided that dynamic and static were two different kinds of complex systems, and that all these 
others were descriptions of a dynamic system while, centralized and all these others were descriptors of static system.  And, 
there, I don't, I don't agree with what I said at all anymore, because to me a static system doesn't have to be a simple system.  
 201 
 
Sam: Systems that are self-organizing don't have to change that much, and if it's predictable, it's static, if it's algorithmic 
behavior it follows rules, so it's got to stay pretty much, in a certain area, it's not dynamic like a system that might, rely on 
chance and random behavior, and isn't centralized. 
 
I: OK, and why did you take away self-organizing? You don't think a dynamic system can be self-organizing?  207 
 
Sam: I think it can...  On a bigger scale, I guess.  If you look at it from a big scale, a system that relies on random behavior, 
might, organize itself in the end, but I mean...                                              209 
 
(pause 4s)                                                                    
 
Sam: You see I hadn't thought of that.  Now I'm not sure anymore.  213 
 
I: No, no, I'm not suggesting that you're wrong...  215 
 
Sam: I know, but you brought it up and...(laughs)  I didn't question that.218 
 
Sam: Because a dynamic system you look at on a bigger scale, to be self-organizing. While a static system I think is more 
self-organizing, but on a smaller scale.                                                       221 
 
Sam: Pretty much. Like I'm saying it goes, up and down.  Like if you're looking at a chart, and it goes up and down, it's not 
continuous, if you're looking at it from far enough away, it does look like, one straight line I guess, if you're looking at it from 
far enough away, and that's...  That's the way I was thinking about it, I guess.                   229 
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Figure 9.     Sam’s concept map - Session 2 & 6 (session 2 upper, session 6 lower). 
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4.3.2 Group 2, “Moderate” Understanding of Complex Systems  
Walter, Sidney and Norman all fell into this classification. Whereas Walter’s (Figure 10) 
map is more similar to Greg and Mitch (see above) in its somewhat hierarchical organization, 
Sidney and Norman produced a cluster type concept map. Walter like Sidney, views “self-
organization” only as a link between types of systems – simple system and complex systems. 
Compared to Sidney (Figure 11), Walter demonstrated some understanding of the probabilistic 
nature of complex systems and the role of random actions. As argued in the section above on 
scoring, this was an important recognition therefore placing Walter’s understanding above that 
demonstrated in Sidney’s maps 
Sidney does not have many important linked relationships. For instances he did not 
suggest any link between “self-organization” and “random” or “probability”. In fact, most of his 
node-link relationships were single attachments radiating out from the central nodes of “complex 
system” and “simple system”. Nonetheless, he demonstrated that he had elaborated his 
understanding demonstrated through the additional terms attached (shown in pink). 
 Finally, both Walter and Sidney added the term “emergent” to their maps, suggesting that 
they were aware of this concept as a central feature of the intervention. In fact, Walter described 
why he added the term in the excerpt below. 
 
 
I: Yeah, it wasn't part of the set of things I gave you.  The ones in grey were the ones that you added.  Which I thought was a 
good thing to add.  237 
                                                                              
Walter: Yeah.  239 
                                                                              
I: I was very pleased that you added those. 241 
                                                                              
Walter: Well yeah, because we observed these things in the computer programs that we were looking at.  243 
                                                                        
 
I: And what's an emergent property again, how would you describe that?  245 
                                                                           
Walter: From what I remember it's just, um from observing the system there's certain properties that are characteristic of that 
system, that you begin to notice after you observe it for awhile.                                    247 
                                                                             
I: OK and an example...?  
 
Walter: (talking over I) I remember, I remember like the...  The clusters there, of like the ants, like the ant hills or whatever... 
 255 
 
Walter: Like that, that I could...  I felt that that was an emergent property, because you know that they're going to, form clusters.  
But you don't know exactly where they're going to be, exactly, because it's still governed by probability or whatnot, but you 
know that they're going to occur.  259 
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 Norman (Figure 12) like Walter also had a somewhat hierarchical structure to his concept 
map. Like Sidney, he too displayed the radiating type of relationship of concepts suggesting a 
less sophisticated relationship between terms.  
Two important differences in Norman’s map are (1) is removal of the term “random”, 
and (2) his failure to add the term “emergent”. Unlike other students within this classification, 
Norman did not integrate the purpose of the study with this activity. It appears that from a 
metaconceptual point of view he experienced the simulations as completely separate from the 
assessment activities. This point will become clearer when looking at the results of the outcome 
measures.  
Although Norman experienced a substantial change between session 2 and 6 as evidenced 
in the changes in his maps; and although he demonstrated a moderate understanding of emergent 
causal processes through the connection of the terms “self-organization” and “probabilistic” 
behavior; he also appeared to be seriously hampered by his component beliefs. Looking at his 
concept map the placement of the term centralized directly beneath self-organization without 
additional qualification, and placing decentralized under algorithmic are tell tail signs of the 
conceptual struggle describe earlier. This is additional evidence of the strong clockwork 
component beliefs guiding his thoughts and limiting his understanding of emergent causal 
processes.  
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Figure 10. Walter’s concept map - Session 2 & 6 (session 2 upper, session 6 lower). 
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Figure 11.     Sidney’s concept map - Session 2 & 6 (session 2 upper, session 6 lower). 
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Figure 12.     Norman’s concept map - Session 2 & 6 (session 2 upper, session 6 lower). 
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4.3.3 Group 3, “Novice” Understanding of Complex Systems  
  
Penny and Emilie fall into the third classification of maps. Both students constructed very 
different types of representations, however both are at a “novice” level of understanding. 
Whereas Emilie (see Figure 14) drew a hierarchical map, Penny (see Figure 13) created a chain-
like map quasi-procedural type map (Ruiz-Primo and Shavelson, 1996). Therefore it may be that 
Penny viewed this knowledge in more of a procedural fashion or maybe she felt safer sticking 
with a simple explanation because she did not know how to describe her developing 
understanding. This interpretation is consistent with DeSimoni and Schmid’s (in press) findings 
that students’ fall into one of three classification of mapping strategies. From their description it 
appears that Penny could be labeled a “safe player” whereas Emilie would be best described as 
“limited processor”. Both these types of strategies may have affected how much either student 
acquired knowledge from this concept mapping process. For instances, even with the direct 
intervening of the coach, and although she was dissatisfied with her map, Penny did not change 
the arrangement of her map. This  “safe player” strategy may be due to her understanding of the 
concepts. As demonstrated elsewhere, Penny found the content itself to be challenging. 
 
Penny: Um, it's, here it says it has self-organization...  973 
 
I: Mm-hm.  975 
 
Penny: ...which, is part of both of them?  977 
  
I: It's part of both of them?  979 
                                                                              
Penny: Yeah.  981 
                                                                              
I: OK, both of...?  983 
                                                                              
Penny: Both simple and complex.  985 
 
I: OK.                                                                        
                                                                              
Penny: Which is, I think, what I thought before.  989 
 
I: Mm-hm. 991 
                                   
Penny: First I think I put it under, simple, but then I changed it.  993 
 
(pause 7s)  995 
 
I: Yeah. (pause 18s; papers ruffling in background)  999 
 
I: Yeah this was the last...  OK, you have self-organization...  Yeah.   
I: First you had a sort of linear description...  1001 
 
Penny: Yeah.  1003 
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I: ...with self-organization as simple, and then you went to, you re-drew it, and you had, self-organizing system connected to 
complex, and simple.  And with this thing...  1005
  (pause 4s) 
 1007 
 
Penny: Um... Well this part for sure.  But uh, after seeing different, uh, systems, and how they're not linear, I don't know if I 
should have put them linearly, even though, it makes sense...  1009 
 
I: Mm-hm.  1011 
 
Penny: ...to me, right now, but...  Somehow I think, it should be arranged, but I don't know how.  1013 
 
I: How? OK.  1015 
 
Penny: I don't, like... (pause 8s)  1019 
  
I: It's OK, you know, it's just it was...  1021 
                                                                             
Penny: No, it, it still makes sense.  1023 
 
I: OK...  1025 
                                                                             
Penny: Well because like, when I put it this way, it doesn't mean that, this whole stack that follows that, it just means that 
they're all, related.  1027 
 
Emilie’s map. Examining Emilie’s concept map, we also see a great deal of difficulty in 
the development of her understanding. Her transcript data indicated that her efforts to create a 
hierarchical structure reflected her clockwork mental model. It appeared that the general 
framework used to understand the simulations, what may be better described as an “analogy”, 
appeared to be a non- emergent hierarchy (i.e., a political system). If fact she explicitly states this 
on several separate occasions.  
Session 4 
Emilie: Now I'm thinking more than one, like, one sort of system.  Like, sort of like mini-system I was going to say, in the um, 
in the, let's say, in the bigger system.  Then you have like different kind of structures in each system, kind of like...  Hm.  Kind 
of like politics. 
 
Later in session 4 she again states: 
 
Emilie: I don't know, um, like you got, what do you got you have Liberals, you've got Conservatives, and they're all in the 
same kind of, you know they're all in Ottawa, and, you know, they're always obviously fighting all the time, but I think it's 
they're all part of the same system which is politics, and you know, the way Canada is going to work, or... 
 
Again during session 5 she says: 
 
Emilie: I don't know, I guess I always understood the um,  I don't know, the social world better, like um... I guess, it wouldn't 
only be political but... So now, you know, I don't know when I talk about systems and complex systems and then simple 
systems driving from that, of a system I think more like a country, a complex system, would be kind of smaller than this huge 
system, it would be more like uh, provinces as I said.   
And then each system, sorry, each simple system, would be um, would be like a town.  Or you know either, oh now, that I think 
rural and urban, I should maybe still do that.  Um...  481 
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Finally, there appeared to be a robust reductive clockwork component belief in Emilie’s 
thinking. In fact, it almost seemed to be a conscience resistance to “seeing” the evidence as 
demonstrated by the simulations as well as the coach’s prompts. Her reaction is best described by 
Chinn and Brewer’s (1993) description of the fifth reaction to anomalous data “reinterpret but 
retain original theory”. Therefore in addition to trying to understand the content knowledge she 
was also challenged by her component belief. Below is an excerpt from her discussion in which 
she insists that systems can be reduced. Of all nine participants, Emilie was the only one who 
appeared to demonstrate this level of conceptual conflict and this level of entrenched clockwork 
belief. 
 
Emilie: It's just... it's not more confusing, it's just what I.. I don't know.  It's just that, well I still stick to what I say earlier, is 
that I would not think of let's say one making, of like decomposing a complex system, I would not think of it, like there's only 
one way to do that.  Like in politics I see this totally in a different way, or...  Not totally, but I don't know, still kind of a 
different way, I would put...   954 
                                                                              
I: OK, you've mentioned that a couple of times.  Decomposing a complex system. Do you think you can really do that 
effectively, of should it be the other way around?   956 
 
Emilie: What do you mean, the other way around?  Like...  Like the way you analyze a new sentence, is that what...  958 
                                                                              
I: Yeah, the way that you would try to understand it.   960 
                                                                              
Emilie:  I think you would more like go and put things back together, and sort of, you know, separate them, because you end 
up with...   962 
                                                                                                                                                      
(pause 10sec)  
                                                                              
I: Think about your body?  If we broke it apart would you be the same?   972 
 
Emilie: Sure, why not?  (laughs) I don't know...   974 
                                                                              
I: Could we put you back together again, afterward?   976 
                                                                              
Emilie: Probably not.   978 
                                                                              
I: Yeah, and why is that?   980 
                                                                              
(pause 5s)   982 
                                                                              
Emilie: I don't know, probably because you're used to some certain structure, and the way they are, and like, the idea of 
putting them back together, we'll not put them back in the right place, or they'll not necessarily know how to function.   And, I 
don't know, the sort of so-called human body.  I don't know.   
Because I'm, I'm thinking of like all those things they do with, I don't know, like take the example of fish, like fish that are, or 
I don't know some animals, they take them into the zoo, in order for them to reproduce, and, like, they've never really tried to 
put them back in their environment, like, if they, if they've been born in the zoo, and they've been fed by a human, and if 
they've never really caught their own prey, and then if you want to put them back into nature, they would not necessarily 
know how to survive or how to react.  So...  I don't know.  I'm thinking that this would probably not...  986 
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Figure 13.     Penny’s concept map - Session 2 & 6 (session 2 upper, session 6 lower). 
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Figure 14.     Emilie’s concept map - Session 2 & 6 (session 2 upper, session 6 lower). 
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4.3.4 Summary on Results of the Concept Mapping Activity 
 
 The concept maps show that most students experienced considerable development in 
their understanding of the concepts regarding complex systems behaviors. Over half were able to 
construct relationships between the key concept nodes of “complex system”, “self-organization” 
and “probabilistic behaviors”. This understanding was also seen in the transcript data (evidence 
discussed in the next section). Four students were able to identify the importance of the concept 
“emergent behaviors” by deciding on their own to incorporate the term into their concept maps. 
This marked a significant development in their understanding of how complex systems are 
related to emergent causal processes. This was noteworthy because some of these changes to 
their maps were made at the final interview, one year after the end of the intervention (i.e., 
session 6). 
 Lastly, one other important observation was made from these concept maps. It appeared 
that the concepts of “random” and “predictability” were particularly problematic for some 
students – a common finding in the literature (e.g., Wilensky 2001). In fact, Norman completely 
removed the term “random” from his final map; and links “predictable” to simple systems. For 
Sidney, it appeared that although he had developed a good understanding of randomness as 
accounting for change he still did not link it to the probabilistic nature of complex systems. This 
was surprising given his transcript data indicated otherwise. However, he demonstrated a more 
sophisticated understanding of “predictability” by annotating the link with the conditional 
statement of “at a higher level”. This suggested that his understanding of “predictability” was 
more in line with the greater stability exhibited by higher levels meta-agents as demonstrated by 
the simulations. On the other hand, Greg, Sam and Walter, from their maps appeared to 
understand the important relationships between “randomness” and “predictability”. However, 
this should not suggest that it was without a certain degree of cognitive struggle as demonstrated 
on several occasions during the intervention by their metacognitive discourse (for examples see 
excerpts in Appendix D).  
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DISCUSSION 
 
5.1 Limitations to Understanding of Ontological Category of Emergence 
 
Chi (2000) proposed that there are three major limitations (inter-related barriers) to the 
understanding of the ontological category of emergence: (1) assignment of micro level behavior 
as linear, (2) lack of consideration of local interactions between agents, and (3) a lack of 
understanding that macro level emergence is the result of collective interactions of agents and 
environment – “interaction in dynamic collection”. Additionally, the literature concerning 
science misconceptions identified six ontological barriers12 that in many ways overlap with those 
described above. Chi (Slotta & Chi, 1999) further proposed that ontological training could 
remove these barriers.  
The results of this current study shows that not all of these identified barriers are equally 
challenging, in fact the instructional intervention was able to change at least two of the six 
subcategory dimensions. However, the evidence also suggests that two of these ontological 
barriers are not affected by the chosen intervention, and at least one of these appears to form a 
firmly entrenched belief that requires special conditions before it may be addressed. 
An analysis of the change in mental models (Table 6) suggested that the ontological 
training produced four patterns of conceptual change. Four students (Monique, Emilie, Penny, 
and Walter) exhibited a novice emergent mental model, one student (Norman) exhibited a 
synthetic 2A mental model, three students (Mitch, Sidney and Sam) exhibited a synthetic 1A 
mental model, and one student (Greg) exhibited an emergent mental model. This pattern is very 
similar to the pattern of acquisition of conceptual understanding of mental models (Figure 4). 
The only difference is that Walter had a higher level of content knowledge (Complex Systems) 
that was revealed by his explanatory framework or mental model.     
 
                                                 
12 1) Isomorphic behavior of both micro and micro levels behaviors (reductive ontology) to emergent aggregation 
behaviors (non-reductive ontology); 
2) Centralized control to distributed or decentralized control (decentralized control); 
3) Linear causal explanation of macro-level behavior from micro-level interactions (i.e., additive, linear) to 
multiple nonlinear causal explanations (nonlinear effects). 
4) Determinacy to indeterminacy (random actions); 
5) Intentionality (i.e., teleological) to stochastic causes (i.e., probabilistic causes); 
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6) Static processes (i.e., beginning-end processes) to dynamic homeostatic behaviors (dynamic self-organizing 
nature). 
5.1.1 Multiple Levels of Organization 
Understanding the concept of “multiple-levels” requires that the learner is able to 
appreciate the different behaviors exhibited by the “agent” (as an independent unit within the 
system), as well as part of the “meta-agent” (the emergent aggregate unit at a higher level of 
organization within the system). The literature (Duit et al., 2001; Jacobson & Archodidou, 2000; 
Penner, 2000) and Chi (2000) suggest that grasping this concept is not an easy task.  
All students appeared to acquire and use the concept “multiple levels of organization”. 
However, their reference to it decreased over the three simulations. Whereas 49% of the total 
observations made during the Slime simulation referred to multiple levels of organization, during 
the FreeGas and Wolf-Sheep simulations the percentage of statements coded to this concept falls 
to 35% and 32.5% respectively. The three simulations offered great affordances for this concept.  
• The Slime simulation, as an example of a tightly coupled organized complexity 
model, exhibits emergence through a physical and perceptual coming together 
(aggregation) of agents. Once these agents are in their aggregate form, they 
display perceptually different behaviors. 
• The FreeGas simulation, as an example of a random disorganized, dissipative, 
complexity model, exhibits emergent aggregation at more abstract levels. For 
instance, the meta-agent behaviors may be seen at the statistical level of 
probabilities where larger populations of molecules produce more stable and 
predictable results. Or the meta-agent may be understood at the mathematical 
symbolic level in which the equation Pv=nRT operates to relate different pressure, 
or temperature values (interpreted as energy and speed on the FreeGas simulation) 
depending on the number of molecules and their initial velocities.  
• The Wolf-Sheep simulation is an example of a complex system somewhere in-
between these two other types of complexity models. Like the FreeGas 
simulation, it too requires the learner to be cognizant of a somewhat abstract level 
of organization (i.e., the oscillating sine wave population variation which is the 
graphical interpretation of the symbol level Lotka-Volterra equation: dn1/dt = 
n1(b-k1n2 and dn2/dt = n2(k2n1-d) used in predator prey interactions). 
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Differences of understanding of the concept of multiple-levels may be due to at least 
three different factors: conceptual, perceptual and individual differences.  
 
Conceptual. The results in this study suggest that when learning about multiple-levels of 
organization (emergent levels) students were less likely to understand this concept when working 
with dissipative models of complexity than when they were working with tightly coupled 
organized models of complexity. One explanation might be that dissipative systems are a more 
difficult subcategory of the emergent causal processes. Therefore they may require more time, 
cognitive effort, scaffolding, or a certain type of “ontological readiness” to facilitate 
understanding. In fact, the observed difficulty of understanding the concept of “multiple levels of 
organization” from dissipative models correlates with the literature regarding misconceptions 
and difficulties in understanding dissipative systems: diffusion, gas laws and equilibrium in 
chemistry (Wilson, 1998); electricity in physics (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; White, 1993); 
and diffusion, and osmosis in the biological sciences (Odom, 1995; Settlage, 1994). 
By contrast, students appeared to have little difficulty with understanding “multiple 
levels” from the Slime simulation. It may be that its representation of tightly coupled organizing 
complexity is more accessible to novice learners. After all we experience such on a daily basis 
(e.g., social groupings like families and friends, neighbourhoods, schools, etc.). Furthermore they 
are more easily identified in nature, colonies of ants, flocks of birds, sheep, for example. 
 Perceptual. Whereas the Slime simulation produces a visible clustering of agents (mould) 
into the higher-level meta-agent (colony), there are no such visual observations in the other two 
simulations. There the learner is dependent on other visual devices such as window displays of 
graphs. Learning such abstract meta-level states may impose a greater cognitive workload or 
demand a higher level of knowledge in order to understand the different representation. From the 
multimedia literature we are told that visual representations such as text and images presented 
simultaneously are more taxing to working memory (Mayer & Moreno, 1998; Clarke & Paivio, 
1991). It is therefore possible that a similar cognitive overload is at work when students attempt 
to decode both the animation of the agents’ lower level behaviors and the graphs of the systems’ 
higher level behavior.  
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Individual. The evidence shows that excerpts from Greg, Mitch, and Sidney, the students 
required appreciable amounts of scaffolding to interpret the output graphs being produced during 
the FreeGas simulation. This suggests that this type of simulation requires more time-on-task, 
and more cognitive scaffolding in order for learners with weaker science backgrounds to gain the 
full benefit of learning about the emergent processes represented as well as the behaviors of 
dissipative systems at the level of the individual. 
 
5.1.2 Local Interactions 
 
The results presented in this report suggest that the concept “local interactions” is the 
most susceptible to acquisition from the three simulations. In essence, all students appeared to 
show substantial gains in awareness as they proceeded through the instructional sessions, and all 
students appeared to transfer some of this knowledge to their explanation of the ontologically 
analogous problems. Slime, FreeGas, and Wolf-Sheep simulations produced a steady increase in 
awareness to (and possibly learning of) the concept of “local interactions”  (22%, 25%, and 
32.5%, respectively). This small but steady increase is the type of result one would expect from 
an instructional intervention, which produced a significant improvement in learning. However, 
the changes observed in this study also suggest several levels of interactions between the 
intervention, the concepts and the students.  
Understanding of “local interactions” arising from the simulations may be explained as a 
consequence of two features. Firstly, the surface level visual cueing of tightly coupled 
interactions and aggregation that were seen in the Slime simulation. Secondly, the causal chain 
cueing in the FreeGas, and Wolf-Sheep simulations. In short, the collision of one molecule in the 
dissipative loosely coupled system still created a change in trajectory which would result in 
another collision and so on. Meanwhile, the ecological systems’ food chain of “sheep eat the 
grass... wolves eat the sheep”, with moderately coupled interactions, was also easily apparent.  
In addition, the increase in observations of local interactions from one session to the next 
could also be explained as a result of the students’ improving ability to observe emergent 
processes at a more structural level (i.e., readout strategies). For instances, students “saw” more 
than the direct interactions between the wolf, sheep and grass, and described the indirect 
relationships in this food chain. Although not all students were able to identify the nonlinear 
effects of these local interactions, they all spent considerable time trying to explain how the grass 
affected the overall balance and survival of the systems.  
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Other studies looking at learning of complex systems concepts have also reported similar 
results. Using conceptually similar, although very different, measures and media (“talus slope” 
and “Life” simulation), Penner (2000) reported that students increasingly recognized that micro 
level interactions were important to the systems’ behavior.  
The results suggest that awareness of the concept of “local interactions” was not only 
related to the opportunities provided by the simulations, but also by the abilities of individual 
students. In fact, Greg and Mitch both demonstrated high levels of awareness of this concept 
during their engagement with the FreeGas simulation (61%, and 43% respectively). Both Greg 
and Mitch belonged to a cohort of high academic achievers and both had above average scores in 
their science courses, particularly in college introductory level Physics. Thus, there may be an 
interaction between the student’s domain knowledge and their ability to perceive these collisions 
as interactions of objects that although inanimate, engage in a flow of energy through the system; 
therefore, displaying behaviors that could be described using a general explanatory model, which 
could also apply to systems as diverse as slime mould.  In fact, the successful results reported by 
the StarLogo researchers (e.g., Resnick, 1994, Wilensky, 1999, 2001) may well be due to this 
ability to “think like a turtle”. In other words, most of the research up to now has been conducted 
with younger children. It may well be that there is a fine line between anthropomorphizing and 
the ability to think at the level of the individual agent. It may be that Greg and Mitch, not 
children but advance-level science students, could think at this level and could “see” the collision 
of gas molecules as interactions and all that they entail (i.e., flows of energy through the system, 
etc.).  Further investigation into this possible relationship is required.   
 Additionally, looking at the specific fine grain differences, Mitch as early as session one, 
began describing the interactions of agents (the slime mould in this instances) using predicates 
that better describe molecules (e.g., “collisions”, “collide”, “hit across”, to list a few). This may 
explain his underlying understanding of the importance of local interactions and consequently 
this dimension of the emergent ontological category. 
 
5.1.3 Nonlinearity and Random Behavior 
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 Nonlinearity and randomness are examples of two Complex Systems concepts that  
presented difficulty to many students. Although the experts identified at least three different 
types of nonlinearity in the three simulations (saturation, positive feedback loop, and negative 
feedback loop), students exhibited little awareness of this concept in the three simulations. In fact 
no student demonstrated a grasp of this concept. However as some students did refer to it in the 
FreeGas and Wolf-Sheep simulations, this knowledge was available. In addition to the weak 
opportunities provided by the simulations for learning this concept, there are possibly 
ontologically-based restrictions. In fact, Chi (2000) identifies this as the first of the three 
ontological barriers based on novice learners’ predisposition to explain micro-level behaviors as 
linear in nature and leading to linear predictable outcomes (labeled item #1).  
 Therefore, is it a question of StarLogo’s affordances for teaching this concept or is it the 
concept itself? As stated before, Penner’s (2000) study examining the use of a “talus slope” tool 
and the “Life” simulation, reports that students provided evidence of some recognition that small 
micro-level changes can have significant macro-level effects. Unfortunately he does not provide 
details on the number of students and percentage of change therefore it is difficult to compare 
these tools to StarLogo models. However, his study suggests that other tools may be more 
successful representations of this phenomenon. Therefore the removal of this barrier through 
training is still an unanswered question. What can be stated from the evidence is that students 
like Greg, Mitch, and Sidney to a lesser degree, who are conceptually prepared and understand 
other aspects of emergent behaviors are able to appreciate the impact of nonlinearity in the 
systems created in StarLogo. This effect is amplified through the coach who was able to prompt 
for more elaboration and metacognitive explanations. 
One of the ontological barriers not identified by Chi (2000) is the attribution of causal 
determinacy (i.e., difficulty in acquiring the concept of random actions). This current study 
shows that, possibly because of weak affordances of the models for learning this concept, 
students experienced difficulty with the notion of randomness. Klopfer and Um (2002) in a study 
of fifth and seventh grade students using StarLogo in a scaffolded learning environment called 
“Adventures in Modeling” also demonstrated that students experienced difficulties with learning 
the concept of random events; although in the latter portion of their 14 sessions intervention, 
students were able to grasp this concept. 
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The evidence from the study reported here is that all students at some level were 
challenged by randomness. In fact, it was the main stumbling block for Greg who otherwise 
acquired an understanding of all the emergent causal processes without exceptional cognitive 
struggle. What this suggests perhaps is that even though students accept the randomness of some 
happenings, as indicated in their answers to the question about ants foraging, at a deeper level 
they struggle to accept the lack of some means of predicting future outcomes (even by 
infinitesimally small or remote means). This deep level understanding is further confounded by 
the limitations of the programmed environment of the simulations, which indeed may confirm 
beliefs that there is some level of predictability because random number generations machines 
are behind these calculations. In fact, this is the level of discussion that Greg, Mitch and Sidney 
all at some point conducted with the coach.  
How then did any of the students show signs of acquiring a deeper level understanding of 
this concept? The evidence suggests that Greg was the only student to describe random actions at 
the deeper level of understanding as an element of true in causal determinacy and “noise”. He 
appeared to accomplish this as a consequence of both cognitive scaffolding and his domain 
knowledge. In essence, during the final interview session, one year after the intervention, Greg 
was asked to explain his concept map. During this discussion, he elaborated on the role played 
by random actions in the behavior of systems. This required him to reflect and in doing so he 
referenced his course work from biology and how the “noise” of random events creates the 
“possibilities” of the future states.  
The attribution of causal determinacy is a key obstacle to understanding emergent causal 
process for most learners. This arises either because of the learners’ component beliefs, as in the 
instantiation of the case study Norman, or because of the confounding of concept and 
programming limitations as demonstrated by Sidney, Mitch and overcome by Greg. This may 
come as no surprise to those investigating the cognitive processes involved in reasoning about 
uncertainty (e.g., Shauhnessy, 1992; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Metz (1998) points to the 
spurious causal attributions that result from misunderstanding of randomness and probability . 
What is surprising is that this same barrier also may account for a major difficulty in learning 
emergent causal processes such as evolution. This contention is supported by research from 
Zaïm-Idrissi, Désautels, and Larochelle (1993) in which, working with 15 graduate level biology 
students (master’s level), they concluded that the majority of the students held deterministic 
forms of reasoning about the topic of evolution. These authors uncovered several inconsistencies 
in the belief systems of the study’s participants, primarily, the conflict between deterministic and 
probabilistic reasoning. 
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Therefore, it is possible that this causal determinacy attribution may be one of the most 
widely interconnected beliefs that affect other related beliefs such as probabilistic causes, and 
even decentralized control. It may well fit Chinn and Brewer’s (1993) description of the 
evidentiary supporting schema. They state: “It appears, then, that well-developed schemas are 
not necessarily entrenched. The key is whether the schema is also embedded in evidentiary 
support and is used to support a wide range of other theories and observations that the person 
believes” (p. 17). Future research is required to try and untangle the possible confounding of the 
simulations’ weak affordances and the students’ ontological belief about randomness. 
 
 
5.2 Triangulation of Data Sources 
 
Triangulation of data collected from different sources is a recommended practice used 
primarily, but not exclusively, in qualitative research studies to establish validity (i.e., 
trustworthiness and authenticity). This procedure of drawing together and comparing data 
collected from different techniques addresses the threat of experimental bias, which may be 
inherent in particular data sources, investigator bias, and methods (Creswell, 1994). The benefit 
of employing a mixed methods research design as in this current study was that it provided these 
requisite differences between data sources. 
In order to conduct the triangulation, we brought together the results from the four main 
data collection instruments used in the case study: (1) Emergent Framework Mental Model 
(EFMM), (2) Clockwork Mental Model (CWMM), (3) Complex Systems Taxonomy (CST), and 
(4) concept maps. We also included the students’ scores on the Nelson Denny Comprehension 
and Reading test, as well as their GPA.  
Table 12 shows the Pearson Product correlations between the above data sets. They 
indicate that, as expected, there is a significant strong positive correlation between the students’ 
understanding of complex systems as indicated by their scores on the EFMM, CST, and concept 
maps  and their academic ability as indicated by their GPA and two scores of the Nelson Denny. 
On the other hand, there was no significant relationship or a significant negative relationship 
between students’ scores on the CWMM and all other measures. 
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Table 12.  Pearson product correlations between different data sources. 
 
CST 
 
EFMM 
 
CWMM
 
GPA 
 
ND (VOC)
 
ND (COMP) 
 
CONCEPT
EFMM   
.946* 1.000 -.805* .897* .949 .908* .826*
CWMM -.846* -.805* 1.000 -.779* -.717 -.725 -.632
GPA .955* .897* -.779* 1.000 .788* .693 .874*
ND (VOC) .895* .949* -.717 .788* 1.000 .974* .815*
ND (COMP) .843* .908* -.725 .693 .974* 1.000 .794*
CONCEPT .910* .826* -.632 .874* .815* .794* 1.000
df r = 7, * indicate significance at least at α = 0.05,  
 
 Finally, the three measures of students’ understanding of complex systems (CST, EFMM, 
and concept maps) are all significantly correlated (at least at α = .01). Moreover, 84% of the 
variability in students’ scores on the concept mapping score are predicted by their scores on the 
CST and EMFF (R2 = .84). These consistent correlation results supports the claim that the data 
collection instruments were measuring the same phenomena. This statistical triangulation of the 
data sources adds trustworthiness to the data analysis methods.  
In conclusion, a non-statistical comparison of the data sources describes a similar 
overlapping of results. Specifically, the classifications of student experiences identified from the 
CST results (ECP Identifiers), as well as the concept map results (Understanding of ECP 
Relationships), lastly the OMMT results (EFMMs Producers). These three data sets show the 
same students, more or less, classified as equivalent levels of understanding across these 
measures (see Table 13). This consistent pattern is another way of demonstrating the 
triangulation the three data sets collected in this study.  
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Table 13. Classification of case study students* across the three data sources. 
Descriptions from Data Sources Classification 
ECP Identifier ECP Relationships EFMMs Producers 
Sophisticated Greg Greg 
High moderate 
Mitch 
Sam 
Sidney 
Mitch 
Sam 
 
Greg 
Mitch 
Sam 
 
Moderate 
Walter 
Norman 
Walter 
Sidney 
Norman 
Sidney  
 
 
Novice 
Penny 
Emilie 
 
Penny 
Emilie 
Walter  
Norman 
Penny  
Emilie 
(N.B. EFMM Producers based on final posttest results). 
* Only students for whom we had full data were included. 
 
 
5.3 Educational Implications 
 
Three main educational implications can be drawn from this study. The first implication 
concerns the ease with which most students can acquire components of emergent framework 
mental models from short-term interventions. These students showed considerable gains in 
learning about emergent causal processes and were able to apply some of these concepts to 
transfer problems.  
The second implication refers to the need for a greater understanding of emergent causal 
processes by curriculum developers (e.g., instructional designers) and teachers so that they are 
more aware of the many opportunities to apply this knowledge. In fact, many teachers and 
curriculum developers lack an appreciation of the constraints imposed by their own linear, 
reductive thinking. Therefore, part of the challenge will be to convey to the educational 
institutions that prepare teachers, instructional and educational technologists an understanding of 
the benefits of emergent causal thinking as a general problem-solving application framework. 
Additionally, until recently there has been a lack of representational tools to readily convey 
emergent processes as demonstrated by complex systems and thereby provide the necessary 
scaffolding for learning these concepts. While these tools are making their way into the 
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educational system, there is a need to develop the easily accessible curricula topics that 
demonstrate complex systems behaviors (e.g., respiration, and cardiovascular circulation in the 
health sciences, the behavior of geological and ecological systems in the natural sciences).  
The third implication is that this alternative explanatory framework may be beneficial for 
all disciplines not just science. If students are better able to explain the social, political, and 
economic interactions they encounter with more than a linear perspective they may in fact do a 
better job of understanding the unpredictable, and probabilistic nature of many of these 
phenomena. In fact, some proponents of complexity theory suggest that interpreting political 
interactions in terms of complex adaptive systems would have foretold of recent world events 
better than the current linear, reductive models. 
 
5.4 Future Directions 
 
This study shows us that it is possible to use newly available representational 
technologies to create specific content models to teach general knowledge of emergent causal 
processes. However, affordances of different models for learning specific emergent causal 
processes are interwoven with the content domain knowledge and representational 
characteristics. If we are to make better use of existing models, we need to know more about 
their capabilities. Therefore, these potentially confounding interactions of content and model 
representation of emergent process need to be closely monitored. Furthermore, there is a need to 
better comprehend the affordances of various media, not just computer simulations, for helping 
students construct the mental representations necessary to understand important complex systems 
knowledge of relevance to the natural and social sciences.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 In conclusion, the results of this study provide strong support that the ontological training 
facilitated the creation of emergent framework mental models (EFMMs). This conclusion is 
supported by the evidence that most students acquire at least four of the Complex-Systems 
concepts    
The affordances for learning aspects of emergent causal processes offered by the multi-
agent models/simulations are highly related to the type of complex system represented and also 
to the students’ background understanding of science. In particular more students had difficulty 
learning with representations (simulations) of dissipative system complexity compared to those 
using representations of tightly coupled organization models of complexity. 
Conceptual change requires not only robust conceptual representations (e.g., models that 
can be used as analogies) but also metacognitive scaffolding and ongoing metaconceptual 
prompts during the instructional phase. Once initiated (i.e., once synthetic mental models are 
created), maturation over time and experience with complementary domain curricula appear to 
have positive effects on the development of more elaborated emergent framework mental 
models.  
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APPENDIX A 
DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS 
 
 
BRAIN TEASER QUESTIONS 
 
 
Name _____________________   Date___________________ 
 
 
DIRECTIONS: You are not expected to know the "real" scientific explanations, however, you may have some 
personal "theories" or understanding about the following phenomena from science articles, novels or movies. 
Therefore, please answer these questions using your intuition (best guess) or knowledge from informal learning 
experiences. 
 
 
 
1. How would you explain how ants find and collect their food. What rules do you believe they follow? Try to 
explain using only the space provided. If you don't know, just make a "X" in the space provided. 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
2. It has been said that a butterfly flapping its wings in Brazil can jiggle the air and thus can help cause a 
snowstorm in Alaska. Is this possible? If so, how would you explain this phenomena? What type of rules would 
permit this to occur? If not possible, what rules do you believe would prevent them from occurring? Try to 
explain using only the space provided. If you don't know, just make a "X" in the space provided. 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
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3. How would you explain the formation of traffic jams? Are there rules that would direct this type of activity? 
Try to explain using only the space provided. If you don't know, just make a "X" in the space provided. 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
4. Suppose large deposits of a cancer-curing mineral were discovered on a distant planet. It is too dangerous and 
costly to send human astronauts to mine the mineral. If thousands of robots were sent. What type of 
programming would be necessary to ensure that the robots would be able to find the mineral, mine it, take it 
back to the space ship and then return to their exploration and mining tasks? In other words, what type of rules 
and strategies should the robots have to follow? Use as much space as required. 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for your cooperation. 
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APPENDIX B 
Coding Templates – EMMF answers & CWWM answers. 
 
 
Table B.1     Prototypical Answers to Butterfly Questions Coded to EFMM Taxonomy 
EFMM Components of coding Butterfly question 
Ontological 
perspective: 
 
Emergent 
 
1) Local interactions among agents, 
2) leads to the creation of something that 
exhibits a differential behavior than those 
of the component agents; 
3) this interaction is made possible due to 
some type of identification (tagging 
device), 
4) and, communication (flows of 
information and/or resources). 
As an individual butterfly’s flapping its wings may create 
a temporary vortex which could potentially interact with 
other local vortices. If there is a steep temperature 
inversion present this initial condition could feed energy 
into the system.  
Control of 
system  
 
Initial causes 
 
Decentralized 
1) The individual agents are independent 
of each other, yet they all operate under 
the same rules; 
2) the systems organizes itself through the 
interactions of these independent agents 
both with each other as well as with the 
environment.  
Prigogines theory of order generation in highly 
distributed systems. 
 
Rules are not involved. Physical laws, generative 
mechanisms and initial triggering conditions are involved. 
 
Action effects 
 
Non-linear 
 
1) Because the system is organized 
through individual and independent 
actions, it is possible that one agent’s 
actions can have exponentially significant 
results. 
Like many atmospheric systems that are chaotic, it can be 
poised on the cusp of an instability, and it can take only a 
miniscule nudge to push the system into one “basin of 
attraction” or another. Once the process is initiated the 
system will tend to slide towards the center of the chosen 
basin. 
Agents’ actions 
 
 
Random 
 
1) Agents at the lowest level appear to act 
in random fashion.  
The initial condition is unpredictable. The single butterfly 
creating a vortex sufficiently powerful, in a location 
which will set the chain of events into motion cannot be 
predicted.  
Underlying 
causes  
 
Probabilistic 
1) The system organizes itself based on the 
interactions of the agents as described 
above, therefore the resulting structure is 
probable.  
2) Like other probabilistic processes, 
larger numbers over longer time periods 
are more likely to result in the formation of 
normal distributions. 
If a vortex is created is created it is by chance. If it grows 
it is by chance. If a large number of vortices are created 
simultaneously it is more likely that one of them may 
contain sufficient energy and be close enough to a steep 
temperature inversion to create an amplifying effect. 
Systems’ Nature  
 
Dynamic 
1) Once the system, the recurring structure, 
emerges it exhibits a more stable quality; 
2) yet all the component agents have the 
potential to be replaced by other similar 
independently operating agents. 
The weather system has many different phenomena that 
create vortices and temperature inversions. As one vortex 
dies (is dampened) another one is formed. Only when all 
the elements interact in a certain way do these events 
grow to a discernable size to be considered a visible 
weather pattern. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.2     Prototypical Answers to Traffic Questions Coded to EFMM Taxonomy 
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EFMM Components of coding Traffic question 
Ontological 
perspective: 
 
Emergent 
 
1) Local interactions among agents, 
2) leads to the creation of something that 
exhibits a differential behavior than those 
of the component agents; 
3) this interaction is made possible due to 
some type of identification (tagging 
device), 
4) and, communication (flows of 
information and/or resources). 
 
Cars interact by responding to the car directly in front of 
them. The rules of operation are as simple as respond to a 
signal, red tail lights. Therefore, when an individual 
driven sees red brake lights go on they too must put on 
their brakes. This starts a chain of events in which the 
drivers behind also respond to this red brake light, an so 
on and so on. This flow of information from one driver to 
the next creates a wave of cars with decreasing speeds.    
Control of 
system  
 
Initial causes 
 
Decentralized 
1) The individual agents are independent 
of each other, yet they all operate under 
the same rules; 
2) the systems organizes itself through the 
interactions of these independent agents 
both with each other as well as with the 
environment.  
All drivers must operate under the same rules otherwise 
there will be not only traffic jams but fatalities as cars 
crash into each other. 
Action effects 
 
Non-linear 
 
1) Because the system is organized 
through individual and independent 
actions, it is possible that one agent’s 
actions can have exponentially significant 
results. 
If one driver chooses to slow down, as indicated by their 
bake lights, then all drivers behind them must slow down 
as well. 
Agents’ actions 
 
 
Random 
 
1) Agents at the lowest level appear to act 
in random fashion.  
The behavior of the individual driver is totally 
unpredictable. There is no way to determine ahead of time 
what of many possible things could make an individual 
driver slow down. (discomfort, distraction, disregard for 
rules, external conditions). 
Underlying 
causes 
 
Probabilistic 
1) The system organizes itself based on the 
interactions of the agents as described 
above, therefore the resulting structure is 
probable.  
2) Like other probabilistic processes, 
larger numbers over longer time periods 
are more likely to result in the formation of 
normal distributions. 
Once the initial conditions establishing the slowing down 
of an individual car occurs, the formation of a traffic jam 
is dependent on many different factors, however, it is 
never certain that this simple act alone will cause a traffic 
jam. It may not if the driver resumes speed, or changes 
lanes, etc. However there are factors which will make it 
more likely that the initial condition will form into a 
traffic jam. One of these is numbers. The larger the 
number of cars on the road, the more likely this initial 
action will cause a jam. Another is alternative routes 
available. If there are multiple lanes available it is less 
likely that the initial condition will result in a jam.  
 
Systems’ Nature  
 
Dynamic 
1) Once the system, the recurring structure, 
emerges it exhibits a more stable quality; 
2) yet all the component agents have the 
potential to be replaced by other similar 
independently operating agents. 
Cars are always on the road and they are always slowing 
down and speeding up. Therefore these signals of red 
bake lights are always going on and off. Therefore to 
have a single incidence of this slowing down produce a 
traffic jam will be dependent on a variety of things, one of 
them is time of day. During certain times day the volume 
of cars increase therefore the likelihood of forming a jam 
increases. Once a jam is formed it maintains itself by 
acting as a backward moving wave: as cars in front leave 
the jam, cars at the rear enter the jam. When the volume 
of cars is reduced, the potential for a jam is still there, it is 
just at an insufficient numbers to reach that critical self-
organizing point. Therefore the traffic system exists 
without the traffic jam. 
 
 
Table B.3     Prototypical Answers to Robot Questions Coded to EFMM Taxonomy 
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EFMM Components of coding Robots question 
Ontological 
perspective: 
 
Emergent 
 
1) Local interactions among agents, 
2) leads to the creation of something that 
exhibits a differential behavior than those 
of the component agents;0 
3) this interaction is made possible due to 
some type of identification (tagging 
device), 
4) and, communication (flows of 
information and/or resources). 
 
Individual robots would communicate with each other 
and with the ship through some type of signaling system. 
The signals would enable them to identify each other, the 
local of the ship, the discovery of gold deposits, locations 
that are easier, trails to follow, etc. 
Once gold is located the signal can be used to draw other 
robots to the location and form some type of physical trail 
of robots moving back and forth from the deposit to the 
ship. 
Control of 
system  
 
Initial causes 
 
Decentralized 
1) The individual agents are independent 
of each other, yet they all operate under the 
same rules; 
2) the systems organizes itself through the 
interactions of these independent agents 
both with each other as well as with the 
environment.  
All robots would be programmed to the same thing: 
search for the particular markers, if sufficient gold deposit 
is identified send out signal to draw other robots to the 
site. In the case of multiple signals respond to the closest 
one. 
 
Action effects 
 
Non-linear 
 
1) Because the system is organized 
through individual and independent 
actions, it is possible that one agent’s 
actions can have exponentially significant 
results. 
If one robot identifies the location of a gold deposit, the 
signal will draw many others to the site. 
Agents’ actions 
 
 
Random 
 
1) Agents at the lowest level appear to act 
in random fashion.  
The individual agent is programmed to search randomly 
until they identify a deposit or they are attracted by some 
signal.  
Underlying 
causes 
Probabilistic 
1) The system organizes itself based on the 
interactions of the agents as described 
above, therefore the resulting structure is 
probable.  
2) Like other probabilistic processes, 
larger numbers over longer time periods 
are more likely to result in the formation of 
normal distributions. 
Once the initial signal is sent out, the system of multiple 
robots working together is dependent on the number of 
robots that are in the location to receive the signal. It is 
also dependent on the number of other signals that may 
be within the system (other robots also sending signals). 
Once sufficient numbers of robots are working together, 
they will attract more robots to join them by amplifying 
the initial signal. In addition, as the trail of robots grows 
the physical obstacles within the environment will 
become worn thereby making the path easier to move 
along.  
Systems’ Nature  
 
Dynamic 
1) Once the system, the recurring structure, 
emerges it exhibits a more stable quality; 
2) yet all the component agents have the 
potential to be replaced by other similar 
independently operating agents. 
In this process, an individual robot may at any point be 
part of the digging crew, transportation crew or delivery 
crew. Once a site is exhausted, the individual will go back 
to randomly searching until there is another discovery and 
the formation of another crew. 
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Table B.4      Prototypical Answer Coded to CWMM Taxonomy 
CWMM Components of coding Example for Butterfly  question 
Ontological 
perspective: 
 
Reductive 
1) agents’ act in isolation. 
2) simple stepwise description. 
 
Storms are local. One to one relationships. Actions are 
cumulative therefore one butterfly is too small to 
matter. 
 
Control of 
system 
 
Centralized 
1) orders/controls come from outside. Or is 
within the system but not attributed to the 
individual agents within. 
E.g., different agents have different rules. 
e.g. mention of hierarchy. 
Weather systems are controlled by higher level  (top 
down) forces. 
Action effects 
 
Linear 
1) one thing leads to another. E.g. direct link 
between controller and controllee. 
e.g., action→reaction 
Small actions and small size cannot affect large 
systems.  
Agents’ actions 
 
Predictable 
 
1) agents’ actions are predictable.  
e.g., they (it) will perform the action. There 
is no mention of randomness or chance in 
their actions. 
Implication that agents’ actions can be calculated and 
factored out. 
 
 
Underlying 
causes 
 
Teleologic 
1) it knows the end point. E.g., it knows it 
has to survive. 
Underlying cause of storms cannot be attributed to 
agent levels probabilities. Storms are determined by 
larger forces outside our control. 
 
Systems’ Nature  
 
Static 
1) explicit descriptions of non changing 
system. 
The effects of the butterflies are local and therefore do 
not account for changes to the system. All actions are 
local and terminate. 
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APPENDIX C 
Procedure Used in Constructing Coding Taxonomies 
 
We collected data from both pre and post intervention interviews. All interventions were 
audio and videotaped in order to permit the researcher to closely observe the interactions and 
reactions of the subjects to the intervention. Several written documents were also produced by 
the subjects as another data set in the qualitative case study: (1) delayed posttest results from 
emergent framework questions; (2) final posttest results from emergent framework questions 
including one on evolution; (3) concept maps of complex systems concepts; and (4) student 
records including Nelson-Denny Reading test, and course grades. The following description of 
the development of the two instruments used to assess the students explanatory frameworks 
(EFMM, CWMM) and the CST are taken from the first author’s dissertation (Charles, 2003).  
As the principle researcher I began the data analysis process by first looking at my 
purpose statement and made the decision to focus on evidence of mental models (e.g., 
observations, explanations, vocabulary use, analogies, and relationships of concepts). This 
should not suggest that I ignored the possibility of emerging data categories that more aptly 
describe the evidence. For instances, categories related to epistemological beliefs, need for social 
interaction, and coaching behavior.  Although these categories are interesting, they lie outside of 
the scope of this report. However, they may provide new directions for future studies. 
 
The Process of Constructing Categories  
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The process of constructing categories from the raw data started with the following 
procedure: transcripts from one student were annotated and a preliminary coding scheme was 
recorded in a coding logbook. Because of the theoretical nature of the research design, a priori 
coding schema were used to develop certain categories. One such category used the complex 
systems taxonomy (CST). The decision to use this taxonomy, rather than the ontological mental 
models taxonomy (EFMM and CWMM), was made because it provided a broader palette from 
which to describe emergent causal processes. Another a priori category was cognitive strategies. 
In the first round of coding they were identified as ‘descriptions’ and ‘sense-making’. Also 
identified were the categories of emotional response, for example, frustration and fatigue, as well 
as the larger category defined by the coaching itself. Development of a coding scheme for the 
latter category was put on hold until the categories for the learners were fully developed.  
Undertaking a second round of coding using the same documents provided a finer 
articulation of the cognitive strategies category. ‘Sense making’ was elaborated into concepts of 
‘paraphrasing’, ‘explanation’, and ‘analogies’. I then went back to the literature to look for 
further theoretical descriptions and explanations of these cognitive processes. Entwistle (1988), 
and Marton (1981) provided insight into the cognitive processes involved in concept formation, 
whereas Keil and Wilson (2000) provided me with greater insight on possible ways to code for 
the category heading of ‘explanation’.  
The category of ‘emotional responses’ was changed to ‘social interaction behaviors’ and 
‘motivation’ (motivated to participate because of: need for social contact; feelings of importance; 
money; interest in topic) and defined to include such concepts as ‘anxiety level’, ‘tolerance for 
ambiguity’, ‘need to please’, ‘feelings of contribution’, ‘need to appear smart’.  In this round of 
coding, another category appeared to emerge, that of epistemological beliefs.  
The third round of coding took the categories developed in the first and second round and 
applied them to two other case studies in the cohort. The two selected were believed to be quite 
different from the original case. The data fit the categories, as defined, and few data points 
remained uncategorized. Nonetheless, there was a further articulation of the cognitive 
engagement category where it was felt that metacognitive strategies were being used in the 
sense-making process. Furthermore, there appeared to be examples of what could be described as 
“meta-model” thinking13 where the student attempted to use the new explanatory framework to 
problem solve using the computer models representations as analogies. It was therefore decided 
to make this a category unto itself. A testable coding scheme appeared to emerge (Tables 3, 4, 
and 5) through these repeated cycles of testing and refining or modifying or eliminating the 
categories.  
Category reliability check. After the third round development I decided to conduct a 
reliability check on the categories. Selecting a totally new transcript (i.e., one that was not part of 
the database used for the study and not transcribed by the research assistant), I met with the 
research assistant (RA) and provided him with some background information concerning the 
types of things that had been coded; for example, evidence of cognitive strategies such as 
explaining through examples, or evidence of complex system’s concepts. The RA was asked to 
use his judgment and intuitions to identify any other categories that he recognized from the 
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13 I suggest that this metacognitive activity is distinct from metaconceptual awareness since the focus is on thinking 
or reasoning with the representational model rather than evaluating the explanatory framework. 
transcript. In other words, to let the categories and coding emerge from the data itself - a 
grounded theory approach.  
What followed was a three-stage process. First, we each independently read and 
annotated our copy of the same seven-page transcriptions. Then I looked at the coded document 
and discussed his coding decisions. The RA had made several interesting and unique 
observations, which were discussed and evaluated based on their significance to the generation 
of useable categories. The categories that appeared to be most fruitful were added to the already 
existing list of categories. Some categories such as psychological interpretations were left out 
because of their subjective nature and the belief that they are not central to the research.  
The final task was to compare the documents coded by the RA. Although the RA did not 
address all the complex systems categories, the agreement on the other categories was very high. 
In several instances we discussed the name assigned to the coded passages or words that describe 
sub-elements of the major cognitive strategies category, in other words, the dimensions of the 
category. By the end, there was consensus on the segments of text that were coded and the 
category assignment of those segments of text. 
 
The Process of Development Themes 
The process of developing themes was informed by Merriam (1998), who tells us that the 
importance of themes is to test out explanations and hypotheses through the linking of 
categories. It is important to note that as the themes emerged they also influenced the types of 
questions that could be explained by the data, hence modifying the central questions of the 
qualitative phase of this dissertation study. Table 14 (also referred to as a “data display” in 
Anfara, Brown, & Mangione, 2002) demonstrates another way that I explored the potential 
hypotheses and explanations as I attempted to link the categories of data. This also was a way to 
ensure having multiple data sources for triangulation of the data analyses.  
 
Table 14.  Finding themes within the data and testing of possible links. 
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Questions that could be 
explored through the 
linking of data. 
Pretest/ 
Posttest 
 
Transcript Concept 
Map 
Delayed 
Posttest 
Study 2 
Nelson 
Denny 
GPA  NYA 
science 
courses 
1. Interaction of sessions 
and learning of Emergent 
Causal Processes (ECP) 
affordances of simulations 
 X X     
2. Learning of ECP and 
transfer to explanatory 
framework, elaborations 
of EFMMs 
 X X X    
3. Interaction of students’ 
profiles and ECP.  X X X X X X 
4. Use of analogous 
models and improved 
understanding of ECP. 
 X  X    
5. Affordances of 
understanding specific 
EFMMs concepts 
- emergent self-organ. 
- probabilistic causes 
- dynamic nature 
- decentralized control 
- random actions 
- nonlinear effects 
X   X    
6. Synthetic mental 
models. X X X X    
7. Correlations of coding 
schema OMMT and CST.  X  X    
 
 
Verification of data. The protocol for verifying the data collected from each instructional 
session was as follows: (1) meet with non-participant observer at the end of each week to discuss 
the progress of the sessions; (2) critically review field notes and make a random check of audio 
and video quality; and (3) use the reflections from the field notes and discussion with non-
participant observer to make modifications for the next session. 
Confidentiality of data. The researcher upheld the requisite “human research ethics” 
measures to insure confidentiality of the entire data corpus. All students are referred to by their 
pseudonym and raw data were shared only with my committee members and coders. 
Ethics of conducting human research. Because my role was that of a researcher /coach 
and not a teacher, I did not actively insist that the student attend to faulty mental models, 
however, I prompted for reconsideration of their statements (e.g., “do you really think that is 
what would happen?”; “could you explain that to me again.”). However, in my commitment to 
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do no harm, if a student appeared to be creating a new mental model (e.g., “aha, I never thought 
it was that way…”), which was a classic misconception, I would actively intervene to halt this 
construction before it was reinforced.  
Other considerations. As a researcher with a limited science background, it was important 
to ensure the veracity and accuracy of the science content. All the instructional materials 
pertaining to the science content were authenticated and accepted by three members of the 
science program faculty (i.e., one from each of the major departments: biology, chemistry and 
physics). They also evaluated the credibility of the selected resources (i.e., web-sites, handouts, 
etc.). In addition, these same individuals, along with an expert in the field of cybernetics were 
responsible for the group instruction delivered in the first phase of the research.  
During the case study sessions, since I was the sole administrator, I curtailed discussion 
that pertained to direct science phenomena that reached beyond my level of accurate knowledge. 
I also was cautious with my use of scientific analogies. Whenever, questions or discussion 
moved into areas of science, or complex systems, that were beyond my scope, my response was 
generally  “to get back to them with an answer”. Fortunately, these situations did not arise very 
often, and when it did, it was primarily with one student whose cognitive skills were far in 
advance of the norm. I have identified only one occasion where I misunderstood this student’s 
questioning and mistakenly provided him with an inaccurate answer, which I attempted to rectify 
in our subsequent session. 
 
 Attempting to reduce the first and third threats to validity, this study used multiple 
measures to generate the data corpus over an extended period of time. Because the data 
collection process spanned almost two years it allowed me to collect a substantial amount of 
evidence of the students’ changes over time. I was able to establish a good rapport with the nine 
students thereby increasing the “emic” component of the data. Subsequently gathering evidence 
of both confirming and disconfirming cases. 
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The second recommendation to improve validity was addressed by having several 
different individuals code the data to obtain an inter-rater reliability correlation score. Lastly, 
accuracy of the facts and interpretation of the transcripts was attempted by having the 
participants themselves review the data – what Creswell (1994) calls “members checks”. 
Because the final session occurred months after the case study intervention, the written 
transcripts were available for the students to review. Additionally, I provided the student with 
his/her summary case reports and reviewed it with each respectively. This allowed for some 
corrections as well as confirmation of their opinions as to how they had experienced the 
intervention. A final effort to confirm conclusions regarding concept maps was made by sending 
JPEG versions to the student by email. I requested feedback if the maps were not representative 
of their current understanding. No one requested changes, although I did receive a few emails of 
salutations confirming that they had received the mailing. 
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APPENDIX D 
Examples of Metacognitive Discourse Representing Cognitive Struggle 
 
Example from Greg. During session 2 he articulated his beliefs in a running discourse that took 
him through the untangling of where the element of randomness was attributable and where it was 
not.  
G: No, it’s like making, um, axioms or something. if you start off with something like although you say 
it’s the probability of it happening, it will happen over time. It’s not really a probability as much as 
it depends as a rule. 
 
I: But, isn’t the rule being given to the individual? 
 
G: But even though the rule is being given to the individual. I guess like, lets say if I said, if I 
switch the nose angle up to 180. Its increases the probability of them conglomerating into groups…  
 
I: Mm-hm. 
G: With them staying there. But the thing is for the individual it increases that but the whole system, 
it means it will have those groups, like what are the chances.  
I mean it just make it kind of a rule, like I switch it and it happens.  It’s not really the chance of 
it, it has an increased chance but that increased chance makes it a rule.  It’s like an axiom of it.  
 
I: OK. Are you suggesting that within this particular system it becomes deterministic? 
 
G: Yeah. If you change certain things. 
 
I: OK. 
 
G: For the individual it’s still chance, it alters your chances for the whole system  
 
I: You think so? 
 
G: I find, well look at this, here I have a nose angle like that … see at zero how quickly it expands, 
right away. 
 
I: OK. Let me understand this more clearly. 
 
G: It’s because the individual, like because the system has order. So like order isn’t based on chance, 
order is based on rules, more … So by changing the chance of the system, no, by switching the chance of 
the individual you change the order of the system  
 
I: OK. 
 
G: Which  is  why, like last class [session] I said that these things like they’re not really affecting 
the individual as much as they are affecting the system because they change the order of the system 
whereas they only change the chance of the individual. Like chance isn’t always the outcome, it’s just 
the most likely outcome.  
 
I: So, if I’m understanding you correctly, if we’re looking at the different levels, at the level of the 
individual, it’s probability… 
G: yeah.  
 
I: But on the level of the system , it almost becomes deterministic?  
 
G: yeah.  
 
G: yeah. And that’s the whole basis of a complex system though, isn’t it?  Like it has um, like the 
individuals wont mirror the system itself. The system itself has a sense of order. It’s not determined by 
the individual. 
 
His understanding of the concept of randomness again showed signs of challenge and development 
in session 5 when constructing his concept map. At this point he recommended removing the term 
 122
“random” since he didn’t see it as truly representative of complex systems’ behaviors. He decided that the 
term “unpredictable” should replace it. This level of debate was a very sophisticated one. As described 
under the heading of affordances for learning emergent characteristics, I point to this as an example of the 
limitations of the Multi-Agent simulations employed in this study. Hence the comprehensive 
understanding of the concept of randomness may be difficult to acquire because the simulations have not 
built in the generation random “noise” within the system. Therefore, I did not judge this as an example of 
Greg’s inability to understand predictable actions versus unpredictable (random action) environments, 
rather, his coming to terms with the representation presented by this conceptual model; therefore, a 
challenge for him to overcome. 
 
(looking at his old concept map) 
 
G: Take off random. I really wouldn’t think that they’re that random anymore. 
 
I: No? 
 
G: Alright. Like I don’t think… I’d say more unpredictable. Am I allowed to add words?  
 
I: Yeah, absolutely. 
 
G: I’d also say that [unpredictable is] not being the same as random.  
 
I: To you random means? 
 
G: It’s just like. Um it’s not even totally unpredictable.  It’s just that it’s not always predictable. 
Whereas random means like totally unpredictable. So this is sometimes predictable. 
 
Eight months after the instructional intervention Greg demonstrated his integration of this concept 
into his EFMM. Using his knowledge from his science courses, particularly biology, he expressed a 
substantial development in his understanding of the concept of randomness. 
 
G: OK, I think the one thing that I’d do, is that I would add random to the single system, to the simple 
system. 
 
I: Why? 
 
G: Because uh…  There’s the uh, the factor of change involved.  And just like the small, minute things 
that each uh, each simple system does…  That, that will get uh, like, absorb into the complex system 
without really having any real effect on it, unless there’s a lot of random events.  But uh, you know 
there has to be randomness somewhere, it’s not like, as I’m far I’m concerned, I mean random events 
happen. 
 
I: OK, and what’s made you change this idea? 
 
G: Um, well I don’t know why I took random out in the first place.  I really, can’t remember.  So uh…  So 
for me it’s not really changing it, it’s just uh…  Just you know… 
   
The coach takes out the notes and reminds him of the debates he had concerning this concept. 
Since he cannot remember exactly what his original thinking was, he was asked to explain once again how 
he now wished to construct his concept map. Before taking biology Greg did not appreciate the role that 
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random noise, like mutations, played in providing the system with opportunities for variety thereby 
changing the direction of the system’s outcome. In session 6 however, he was able to eloquently express 
the function of randomness within the complex system stating: “it creates possibilities”. He also appeared 
to have integrated this concept with that of probabilities which provide the system with a sense of order. 
 
G: OK, so you want me to explain it like a friend to you? 
 
I: Yeah. (laughs) 
 
G: OK, well, I’d say, a complex system is uh, is made up of simple systems.   Of which it can be uh, I’m 
trying to get away from this light but not in my face, OK…   A complex map is made up of simple systems.  
And these simple systems are random, and dynamic.  Like, they follow simple rules, but there’s also the 
whole probability of chance. Like chance is a factor.  And so that creates um, randomness, and that 
creates possibilities, also.  That if there were no random events, then you wouldn’t have those 
possibilities.  Um, but all these chance events, they, when they get absorbed into the complex system, 
they have very little effect.  It’s like throwing a pebble into a river.  Sure, you might course the 
river in a one in billion chance or something, but chances are it does nothing.  It’s not going to affect 
the flow of the river in any way.  Uh, so, what that means is that complex systems, they follow more 
rules of probability, and they, they…  They I kind of guess being mathematically defined, with algorithms 
I guess, because they’re more likely to, have, um, a real sense or order, that the simple system itself 
won’t have.  So what that means is that it’s self-organized, and it’s uh, um… It’s called emergent 
properties.  Um…  A complex system is obviously a system, I think that’s, a little bit uh, redundant.  
And there is the chance of uh, unpredictable events, for example, you did throw the pebble.  That pebble 
might stop the flow of the water, by the grace of God or something, so nothing is for sure I guess, there 
is always the element of chance involved.  But they’re by and large more predictable than simple systems.  
And… I think I used everything here. 
 
In a closing comment regarding this concept Greg says: 
 
G: I guess it’s just, they’ve become morel like, more apparent to me, like…  That you need probability 
and chance, I guess I just finally realized it today a little bit more, that you need, like there has to 
be, different levels, otherwise it’s like it’s not a complex system.  That’s the whole, notion of it.  
And that there’s some type of emergent properties in the system.  Because otherwise you wouldn’t use a 
system to, to describe it. 
. 
